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land-based short-range nuclear forces (SNF), such as the Lance missile, is also
seen by many as critical to the maintenance of Alliance security in the after-
math of INF. Here too, however, a number of problems remain to be resolved.
It seems likely that the debate over NATO's security options in the coming years
will be as complex and contentious as any that faced the Alliance since 1949.
At the same time, there is no reason to suggest that the will of the NATO
members to maintain there freedom and independence has lessened or that the
prospects for successful WTO aggression are measurable greater after the INF
treaty than before its ratification.
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NATO Deterrence and Defense
After the INF Treaty
by
Stephen A. Garrett
The treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States
eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) in Europe raises a number of questions about NATO's future
ability to deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Future choices on
Alliance strategy and doctrine will be influenced by a variety of
factors, including the image of "new thinking" in Soviet security
policy enunciated by General Secretary Gorbachev, changing West
European opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons for NATO
deterrence, the complications inherent in further nuclear and
conventional arms control negotiations, assessments of the
current conventional arms balance in Europe, and ongoing
questions about NATO cohesion as well as the continued "coupling"
of American security with that of her European allies. In the
post-INF environment it may well be that U.S. Navy nuclear assets
will assume an increasingly important role, particularly the
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). The TLAM/N
has many attractive attributes that can be supportive of NATO
deterrence of the WTO, but there are also a number of unresolved
questions to be addressed concerning this particular weapons
system. Modernization of NATO's land-based short-range nuclear
forces (SNF), such as the Lance missile, is also seen by many as
critical to the maintenance of Alliance security in the aftermath
of INF. Here too, however, a number of problems remain to be
resolved. It seems likely that the debate over NATO's security
options in the coming years will be as complex and contentious as
any that faced the Alliance since I949. At the same time, there is
no reason to suggest that the will of the NATO members to
maintain there freedom and independence has lessened or that the
prospects for successful WTO aggression are measurably greater
after the INF treaty than before its ratification.

INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty eliminating all U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and
shorter-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise-missile systems.
Some six months later the President and the General Secretary at
the Moscow summit exchanged instruments of ratification of the INF
Treaty, whereupon the agreement formally entered into force."'
Clearly a major milestone in Soviet-American, and more broadly
East-West, relations had been achieved. The subject to be
addressed in the following analysis is the likely impact of the INF
accord on the future military and political functioning of the NATO
alliance. In particular, how may the treaty impact on NATO's
continued ability to deter possible Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) aggression against Western Europe?
A summary of the treaty's provisions is in order at this point.
At the heart of the agreement was the elimination within three
years of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. Moreover,
missile support facilities are to be eliminated and INF missile
production and flight testing banned. Under the INF treaty the Soviet
Union will be required to dismantle some 857 deployed missiles of
1 United States Department of State, THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. Selected
Documents No. 28 (Washington: GPO, August, 1988). For the full text
of the INF treaty, see MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Treaty Document 100-11, One hundredth Congress, Second
Session, January 25, I988.
2various types (notably 405 SS-20's) with 1667 warheads. The
United States will have to eliminate 429 missiles with the same
number of warheads. Thus the agreement calls for an asymmetrical
reduction of Soviet INF assets compared to American on the order of
about four to one. 1
The fact of asymmetry in force reductions in the INF treaty
may prove to be one of the most important precedents established by
the agreement. The position of Western arms control negotiators is
likely to be strengthened by this Soviet acceptance of the principle
of asymmetrical reductions, especially in the current talks on
START as well as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
negotiations. In both cases, Western concerns about large Soviet
leads in missile throw-weight and in conventional assets such as
tanks and artillery make an acceptance of asymmetrical reductions
virtually a necessity if agreements in either or both of these areas
are to be achieved.
Another important precedent established by the INF treaty is
the establishment of an unprecedented regime of quite intrusive on-
site inspection, detailed data exchanges and other verification
measures. Certainly exchanges of baseline data on various weapons
systems will be crucial to the successful resolution of iher START
or conventional force reductions talks. On-site inspection to
monitor the destruction of systems to be eliminated, as well as
1 Lewis Dunn, "Considerations after the INF Treaty," SURVIVAL (May-
June 1988), 196.
3human and technical inspection of future production of items limited
by treaty will also be critical as verification measures. 1
Having summarized the essentials of the INF treaty, the
principal question to be considered is how the treaty impacts on
NATO's defense capabilities for good or ill. Ratification of the
treaty, as noted, will require the U.S. and the USSR to achieve a
substantial reduction in numbers of LRINF and SRINF missiles. It is
likely that other U.S and allied and nuclear and conventional forces
will be called upon to assume a greater role in deterring Warsaw
Pact aggression. Our research here will address the potential
contributions of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear
(TLAM/N) and other Navy nuclear forces as well as the nuclear and
conventional forces of other NATO members. Potential strategy,
doctrine and policy impacts that could attend a shift in NATO
strategy will also be addressed. 2
In considering these matters we are confronted with
something of a paradox. In the sometimes contentious processs of
achieving ratification of the treaty in the United States Senate,
leading military and civilian spokesman for the Reagan
Administration stressed that the INF accord would have no
deleterious effects (at Itast in the short run on Alliance
capabilities for deterrence of the WTO. Thus SACEUR General John
Galvin, in urging ratification of the treaty, denied that the "double-
1 1bid., 198.
2 This statement of research goals in this paper is based on the
official tasking assigned to this author by the Defense Nuclear
Agency for the project entitled "Nuclear Assessments," of which the
present essay represents one part.
4zero" provisions of the accord (elminating all Soviet and American
weapons of a certain class in Europe) made him "uncomfortable." As
Galving put it, "I can still carry out my mission, which is to deter
war and, if that fails to defend the land mass of Europe. In the same
vein, Secretary of State George Shultz asserted that the INF
agreement represented "an outcome which NATO has long sought. . . ."
It reduces the threat to NATO and enhances the security of the
alliance.
At the same time as these optimistic assessments of the
Treaty's effects were being offered, however, virtually all the
supporters of ratification also coupled their upbeat assessment
with a cautionary note that what were generally called
"compensatory measures" had to be pursued in order to blunt any
possible future negative consequences of Washington's signing of the
accord. General Gavin thus stated that there was "an element of
risk from which the alliance must not suffer", i.e., this risk could be
set aside if appropriate compensatory measures were taken. Mr.
Schultz was asked about this seeming paradox: if the treaty was so
good for NATO, why the necessity of such measures? In response,
the Secretary indicated his dislike for the term "compensatory
measures", saying that actually the n asures referred to were
already in the process of being implemented and represented a long-
standing NATO decision to modernize various aspects of its nuclear
and conventional arsenal (the Montebello Conference in 1983
5providing for the former and the CDI (conventional defense
improvements) plan of 1985 for the latter). 1
There certainly was a logic to Mr. Schultz's response, but at
the same time his answer disguised a fundamental dilemma:
suppose that all the measures of modernization agreed to at, for
example, Montebello were no_i implemented (e.g., the upgrading of
NATO short-range nuclear forces such as the Lance). Given a number
of political factors to be addressed below, such an outcome seems
well within the realm of possibility. In such a circumstance would
the impact of the INF treaty on NATO's security posture have to be
re-evaluated, and possibly assessed in a far more negative fashion?
This is one of the issues that will receive considerable attention in
what follows of this analysis.
The focus of our discussion will basically be on the nuclear
component of NATO modernization efforts, on alternative measures
to supply nuclear assets to NATO defense planners, in effect (if not
in theory) as at least a partial reaction to the changed security
situation in Europe occasioned by the INF treaty. Some attention
will be given to conventional force structures here to the degree
that they influence judgments on nuclear force planning but
limitations of space prevent a systematic consideration of this very
important matter. Finally, the emphasis here-again for reasons of
limited space--will be largely on the American contribution to




6A number of new American nuclear deployments in Europe or
offshore have been suggested as one way in which to adjust for the
forthcoming elimination of Pershing-ll and GLCM assets under the
INF treaty. These include: 1) The positioning, and possibly formal
assignment of, additional nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCM's) on both U.S. Navy submarine and surface ships to NATO
defense; 2) Creating a NATO force of surface ships with nuclear
cruise missiles; 3) Increasing the number of dual-capable aircraft in
Europe; 4) Deploying additional nuclear-capable F-111 aircraft to
the United Kingdom; 5) Deploying aircraft with nuclear air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCM's) within Europe; and 6) Deploying B-52G
bombers with ALCM's in Europe. 1
As will be discussed, some of these remain only in the
speculative stage, whereas others are actually in the process of
being implemented. Whether these measures remain only a
possibility or are now a reality, however, they both are impacted by
a host of inter-locking political-military challenges and
controversies that are part of the broader strategic environment of
NATO after the INF treaty. In the discussion which follows we will
attempt to sort out the relevant factors in this environment and how
they may condition choice on specific weapons systems and, more
broadly, NATO doctrine, strategy and policy direction.
1 Dunn, "Considerations after the INF Treaty," 207; John D. Morrocco,
"Allies Weigh New Deployments to Offset Proposed INF Cuts,"
AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY (May 18, 1987).
I.
THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION REVISITED
Any assessment of NATO's security options following
ratification of the INF accords has to begin with an evaluation of the
original December, 1979 "dual-track" decision by NATO members to
upgrade their INF capabilities by the introduction of the Pershing II
and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) into the NATO arsenal
(the other "track" being a continued effort to achieve an arms
control agreement with the Soviet Union that would limit INF
systems in Europe). The overall rationale for this decision was tied
to the threat posed by the steady development of the Soviet's own
INF capabilities, in particular the MIRV'd SS-20. Although Moscow
claimed that that the SS-20 basically represented only an upgrade of
the older SS-4 and SS-5 systems, the prevailing NATO view was that
the SS-20 in fact represented a qualitative change in the theater
nuclear balance in Europe. 1 Hence the necessity for some sort of
NATO response if the nuclear component of European deterrence was
to remain credible.
It is important to recall that the main initial impetus leading
to the December, 1979 decision came not from the United States but
1 For a review of basic elements in Soviet INF strategy predating the
December, 1979 NATO decision, see Stephen M. Meyer, SOVIET
THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES: PARTI: DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE AND
OBJECTIVES. Adelphi Paper No. 187 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1983/1984).
8from her European partners in NATO, and in particular Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt of West Germany. In a major address to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in October,
1977, Schmidt argued that "changed strategic conditions confront us
with new problems." He referred in particular to the rough parity in
central strategic nuclear systems that he saw as existing between
the United States and the Soviet Union, which called into question
the traditional American commitment to use such systems if
necessary in the defense of Europe. Given strategic nuclear parity
between the superpowers, as well as the Soviet upgrade of its INF
assets, it was important to consider a rectification of "the
disparities of military power in Europe." 1 Important American
officials such as American National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, on the other hand, believed at the time that there was
really no pressing military need for a NATO INF upgrade although
Washington would consider proceeding with such if it would meet
European concerns.
2
The Pershing-ll and GLCM As Weapons Systems
When examined in detail, the introduction of the Pershing ll's
and the G CM's was on the other hand a decision clouded in
1 Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture,"
SURVIVAL 20 (1978).
2Zbigniew Brzezinski, POWER AND PRINCIPLE (New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 294, 307-308. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance held roughly similar views. See Congressional Research
Service, THE MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE THEATER
NUCLEAR FORCES (Washington: GPO, 1981), 19.
9considerable ambiguity. An initial summary of the technical
characteristics of these systems is necessary in sorting out the
elements of this ambiguity. The GLCM component of the package, the
Tomahawk, had a range of about 3000 kilometers, and could
maneuver on its way to the target (although this reduced somewhat
its operational range).'' A key characteristic of the Tomahawk was
that it flew at sub-sonic speeds, on the order of about 550 miles per
hour. This placed targets in the Soviet Union about one to three
hours away from basing sites in Western Europe, which meant that
the Tomahawk was hardly suitable for strikes against time-urgent
targets such as missile silos and C^ facilities. On the other hand,
its relatively small radar cross-section and its ability to fly low to
the earth under Soviet radar made it relatively impervious to Soviet
air defenses. 2 The original decision to employ the Tomahawk in
Western Europe envisaged a total of some 464 of these missiles,
based in five different NATO countries: Itlay, Great Britain, Belgium
the Netherlands and West Germany.
.
The Pershing II, unlike the Tomahawk, was a ballistic missile,
an improved version of the Pershing 1-A already deployed in West
Germany. It was characterisede especially by its greatly increased
range compared to the Pershing l-A (almost twice that enjoyed by
1 U.S., Department of Defense, The FY 1981 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
PROGRAM FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
(Washington: GPO, I980, John Toomay, "Technical Characteristics,"
in Richard C. Betts, ed., CRUISE MISSILES: TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY,
POLITICS (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 36-41.
2David Hobbs, CRUISE MISSILES: FACTS AND ISSUES (ABERDEEN:
CENTRE FOR Defence Studies, I982), 20.
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the earlier system) and its pinpoint accuracy. Its range was
estimated to be about 1800 kilometers, which meant that from
bases in West Grermany it could reach just short of Moscow. Its
flight time for such a mission was from ten to fourteen minutes,
which meant that it was suitable, unlike the Tomahawk, for
attacking time-urgent targets. 1 The 108 Pershing IPs decided on in
the December, I979 decision were to be based at three sites in West
Germany.
Rationales for the INF Upgrade
The ambiguity referred to earlier concerning the deployment of
the new NATO INF systems consisted in part of questions about their
specific military utility but even more about their overall
contribution to the deterrence of Warsaw Pact aggression. On the
first point, it was evident that the targets that the new missiles
could potentially attack were already largely covered by existing
NATO assets, including aircraft of various NATO powers, American
SLBM warheads assigned to NATO, and U.S.-based central strategic
systems. The Deputy Under Secretary for Defense under the Carter
Administration frankly admitted in this context that "requirements
for theater nuclear force modernization is not principally an issue
of hitting new targets."2 One response to this observation was that
1 Kevin N. Lewis, "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons," SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 243 (December, I980), 64; U.S., Congress house of
Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE.
2 Cited in William Arkin, "Pershing II and U.S. Nuclear Strategy,"
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 39 (June-July, 1983), 12.
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the new systems were more effective than those already extant for
hitting certain classes of WTO targets, including C3 (the Pershing II)
and different types of troop and tank concentrations as well as
enemy airfields (the Tomahawk). Moreover, using GLCM's in a
European conflict might free other NATO dual-capable aircraft for
conventional roles and missions. Moreover, the fact that both the
Pershing II and the Tomahawk were designed as mobile systems
presumably would complicate WTO hopes of eliminating this
particular threat, especially if NATO commanders had sufficient
warning to disperse the TEL's away from their basing sites.''
On balance, however, the mere introduction of 572 new
warheads on the Pershing II and the Tomahawk into the European
theater could hardly be regarded as constituting a decisive change in
the operational INF balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In
actuality, the prime rationale for the December, 1979 decision had
to do far more with the supposed requirements of deterrence than of
defense. A variety of separate, though not necessarily mutually
contradictory, missions for the new missiles were offered in this
regard. 2
It was suggested in the first place that the GLCM's and
Pershing-ll's were needed to fill a "gap in NATO's continuum of
deterrence". In an earlier era the superiority of American central
strategic systems was supposedly sufficient in itself to deter WTO
iLeon V. Sigal, NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1984), 33-34.
2A good survey of all the ingredients in the December, 1979 decision
is David N. Schwartz, NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMAS (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1983), Chapter 7.
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use of theater nuclear weapons in Europe (the assumption being that
the United States could deliver a strategic nuclear strike against
the Soviet Union itself in retaliation for such use and do so with
relative impunity). Once the Soviets acquired at least a rough
parity with the United States in strategic striking power, however,
the threat of American retaliation was blunted and this might
encourage WTO planners to contemplate use of theater nuclear
weapons without fear of a strategic response from the United
States. Under NATO's doctrine of flexible response, the Alliance
required some intermediate level of reaction to a WTO initiation of
theater nuclear warfare—especially given the new strategic
balance-and hence the need for the INF upgrade. 1
Related to the above rationale was the supposed utility of the
new NATO systems for "selective employment plans" (SEP's). SEP's
contemplate the "limited" use of nuclear weapons to signal a step up
the escalation ladder. In theory the WTO advantage in INF weapons
gave them a decided edge in "escalation dominance", that is, they
could raise the stakes in a European conflict by initial use of nuclear
weapons and present the NATO decision-makers with the unpalatable
options of either acquiescence or an inappropriate and possibly
disasterous leap to use of central strategic systems. The
availability of the new Tomahawks and Pershing-ll's would enable
NATO to match the WTO's SEP's with their own, and thus signal
1 J. Michael Legge, THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NATO
STRATEGY
OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, R-2964-FF (Santa Monica: The Rand
Corporation, 1983), 32-38.
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continued resolve while avoiding a catastrophic leap into either
surrender or general nuclear war. 1
The above two rationales for the NATO INF upgrade were
couched in fairly escoteric terms involving military doctrine and
strategy, and presumably were meant more for specialists in the
defense community than for a general audience. In explaining the
December, 1979 decision to their own publics in Western Europe and
the United States, the various governments involved tended to
reduce the necessity of the new deployments to a matter simply of
countering the spectre of ever-increasing numbers of Soviet SS-20's
assigned to the European theater. The SS-20's, with their
increased accuracy, mobility and improved readiness--not to
mention their three MIRV'd warheads-supposedly threatened the
whole INF balance in Europe. Deployment of the new NATO systems
would help to redress this imbalance, even if it did not totally
correct it. In this sense, the 1979 decision could simply be
regarded as symbolic of NATO's will to resist unilateral and
unprovoked attempts by the WTO to alter the military equation in
Europe, either as preparation for armed aggression or, more likely,
as a means for applying political pressure on the European members
of NATO.
There was also the matter of "coupling". Integral to the
whole NATO defense concept since 1949 was that American security
had to be coupled with that of Western Europe in order to make the
American defense commitment to Europe credible. In a shorthand
1 Sigal, NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, 38-40.
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sense, this simply meant that the United States would regard any
attack on a European ally as an attack on her own soil. Whether
successive American statesmen, at least privately, felt that such a
coupling really or at least in every case would apply was a
controversial matter besetting the Alliance in subsequent years (a
controversy that played a major role, for example, in De Gaulle's
development of an independent nuclear deterrent of his own as well
as his withdrawal from the unified NATO military command). 1
In any case, the deployment of new American INF systems in
Western Europe would supposedly do much to reinforce the coupling
of American and European security. Given the existence of such
systems, and their threatened use in response to a conventional
military aggression by the WTO, the latter would have strong
motivation to undertake a nuclear preemptive strike against the
GLCM's and Pershing-H's (using nuclear rather than conventional
assets in order to assure their destruction). Given this decision,
there would be further pressure on WTO planners to undertake at
least a limited strike against American central strategic systems,
lest these be used to retaliate for the WTO initiation of INF warfare
in Europe. Under these circumstances, any American President
would feel compelled to commit all of American military resources
to the struggle against the WTO. The point here is that the threat of
1 An early statement of the basic French position here was Pierre
Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," ORBIS 7 (Summer,
1963).
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such an outcome would act as a powerful deterrent to the WTO
contemplating any aggression in the first place. 1
An Evaluation
The above rationales for the NATO INF upgrade had at least
some logical appeal, and indeed there were some items of merit in
each of them. On balance, however, when subjected to rigorous
scrutiny, they seemed to be a fairly ambiguous basis on which to
make so momentous a decision as that arrived at in December, 1979.
With respect to the so-called "gap" in the continuum of deterrence,
for example, the fact remained that the Pershing-H's and the GLCM's
were unmistakably American systems, even if they were physically
located in Western Europe. Their potential use (e.g., to stem a
conventional WTO attack against the West) therefore invited a
possible Soviet strategic strike against the United States in
retaliation. The point here is that it was unclear at best whether
WTO military doctrine was willing to recognize so abstract a
concept as discrete rungs on the escalation ladder-or at least
would be bound by such a concept.
As to the notion of a SEP mission for the new systems, both
the Pershing-ll and the Tomahawk would be vulnerable to a general
1 Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Spring, 1988), 721. Ambassador Max Kampelman was firm in his
belief that the deployment of Soviet SS-20's was "a political as
well as a military weapon, meant to intimidate Europe and inspire a
sense of 'decoupling' from the United States." U.S., Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, THE INF TREATY, Part I, One
Hundredth Congress, Second Session, 443.
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disarming strike by the Soviets once any of them were fired. This
in turn would create considerable pressures to use all or most of
them before they could be destroyed by a Soviet counter-strike.
This scenario, however, contradicted the very idea of a "SEP".
Moreover, European opinion was, to put it mildly, uncomfortable with
the notion of using the central European battleground as an arena for
nuclear demonstration shots while at the same time the United
States itself remained untouched. Implicit to the notion of a SEP
was also the idea that such a doctrine would allow Washington to
avoid the far more fateful decison of committing its central
strategic systems to the defense of Europe. 1
Nor does it seem plausible to argue that the INF upgrade was
simply a response to the unprovoked Soviet development of the SS-
20. It was true that the latter system demonstrated a range of
improved capabilities and no doubt complicated NATO defense
planning. Nevertheless, it is important to note that initial NATO
discussions on the possibility of placing new INF systems in
Western Europe began as early as 1974 in meetings of the Nuclear
Planning Group. 2 Research and development on the relevant systems
had begun even earlier. The first operational SS-20 sites did not
1 Christopher J. Makins, "TNF Modernization and Countervailing
Strategy," in Robert Nurick, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN
SECURITY (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984), 131-132.
2An important study emphasizing the need for NATO INF
modernization was issued in 1975. See U.S., Department of Defense,
THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE. A report to the
United States Congress in compliance with Public Law 93-365.
(Washington: GPO, 1975).
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emerge until late in 1977. 1 Moreover, the Pershing-ll's and GLCM's
were hardly the best response to the SS-20 threat, given their
vulnerability to a Soviet preemptive strike. Soviet military
doctrine suggests that just such a preemption would be a heavy
consideration in the event of a planned attack against NATO,
particularly in view of the Pershing-ll's threat to time-urgent
Soviet targets such as missile sites and Soviet C^. What was
really needed for NATO were nuclear systems that could survive a
Soviet first-strike and then retaliate against either Soviet or East
European targets or both.
The Primacy of Political Symbolism
A balanced assessment of the December, 1979 decision to
upgrade NATO INF capabilities suggests, then, that the real rationale
for the decision was basically political rather than one dictated by
discrete military requirements. 2 In this sense the argument about
the need for re-emphasizing the coupling of American security with
that of her European allies perhaps comes closest to what was the
actual consideration uppermost in the minds of the NATO
governments in 1979. More specifically, the upgrade was designed
in a largely syn.bolic way to demonstrate the continued commitment
of the United States to European defense, especially in an era in
1 Raymond Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," SURVIVAL (May-
June, 1983).
2 Peter H. Langer, TRANSATLANTIC DISCORD AND NATO'S CRISIS OF
COHESION (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986),
21.
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which the Soviet military buildup seemed to be proceeding in a
fashion without identifiable, stated or even rational limits. 1
This assessment that the INF upgrade was driven more by
political than military requirements can be supported in various
ways. For example, the American military services were actually
rather lukewarm in their enthusiasm for the upgrade, at least if it
meant that their shares of the defense budget were to suffer as a
result. Moreover, the choice of the Pershing-ll and the Tomahawk
as the systems to be introduced had little to do with an analysis of
their technical virtuosity in contributing to the NATO defense
posture. Rather they were chosen for reasons largely extraneous to
considerations of targeting, survivability, doctrine or mission. An
important consideration was that given the basic decision to
upgrade NATO INF capabilities, these two systems were virtually the
only ones far enough along in the research and development cycle to
be available within the desired four-year time-frame after 1979
(assuming no arms control agreement was achieved with the Soviets
by 1983 making their deployment unnecessary). Both systems were
also land-based and could strike the Soviet Union, which in each
case was critical to their role as political symbols. 2
"•Christopher J. Makins, "Bringing in the Allies," FOREIGN POLICY 35
(Summer, 1979). On the matter of political symbols, see also
Lawrence Freedman, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Symbols,
Strategy and Force Structure," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN EUROPE (New York: New York University Press, 1984),
55-61.
2Sigal, NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, 50-52.
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The final number of weapons to be included in the upgrade was
also essentially political. Thus the 108 Pershing-H's specified in
the decision exactly matched the number of older Pershing-I-A's
already based in West Germany. Describing this part of the 1979
decision as simply a "modernization" of existing systems in that
country was politically useful in explaining the development to
certain segments of West German public opinion. As to the 464
GLCM's to be introduced to the West European theater, this number
was in part a function of simple arithmetic (arrived at by
multiplying the four Tomahawks in a TEL and four TEL's to a flight)
and in part by the requirement that the GLCM's be based in several
West European countries as a "risk-sharing" measure.
1
In assessing NATO's security options after the INF treaty, in
sum, it is critical to recognize the essential rationale and spirit of
the original NATO INF upgrade decision. The above discussion
suggests that a particularly important avenue of investigation for
our subsequent analysis of NATO's defense posture must be a
consideration of how and to what degree the political environment
that surrounded the December, 1979 decision has been subject to
change. There are a host of other factors and variables as well that
must be taken into account in evaluating NATO's choices on doctrine
and strategy. An overview of these matters is offered in the next
section of this paper.
1 Raymond L. Garthoff, "The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear
Forces," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 98 (Summer, 1983), 206.
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II.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT NATO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
There are a number of issues and considerations that deserve
attention in any attempt to evaluate American and NATO defense
options in Europe in the aftermath of the INF treaty. Some of these
relate to the current climate of public opinion in Europe, and
especially in West Germany, concerning future force deployments
and strategy. Connected to this factor is the whole issue of
Alliance cohesion, and how decisions on NATO's defense posture have
the capacity either to contribute to such cohesion or seriously to
theaten it. Then there is the matter of "burden-sharing",
particularly in terms of conventional force levels, and whether the
United States or the European members of NATO can be expected to
assume greater responsibilities for an upgrade of conventional
capabilities. In this context, there is also the question of intra-
European cooperation in defense matters (e.g., the Franco-German
brigade) and whether such efforts may be expected to play an
important role in maintaining NATO deterrence of the WTO.
Also important is the current debate over the conventional
balance in Europe: differing percept,ons here can heavily influence
judgments as to the necessity of nuclear force upgrades. Related
to this is the prospect of a formal treaty reducing both NATO and
WTO conventional forces in Europe, the negotiation of which is now
on-going in Vienna. Arms control issues in general are of course
critical, especially the START talks. Decisions on new nuclear
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force deployments may heavily influence prospects of achieving a
START treaty, particularly in terms of the possibilities of adequate
verification.
Finally, there is the overarching matter of ostensible "new
thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, including an emphasis now on
mere "sufficiency" in WTO force levels to deter aggression as well
as a stress on a purely defensive strategy. Whatever the reality of
these supposed changes in Soviet doctrine, to the extent that they
impact on West European (and even American) public opinion they are
an important matter to be taken into consideration. What follows
is a brief consideration of each of the above factors as they
influence current defense planning within NATO.
The Changing Climate of Public Opinion
In addressing various questions that have emerged out of the
ratification of the INF treaty, NATO Secretary-General Manfred
Worner touched on a key element in the current political-security
environment in Western Europe.
NATO has always lived with a paradox. As we
make progress in our search for a more certain peace, our
people question the need for continued levels of defence
effort. This is even more so today, I suspect. How do
we explain to our publics the basis on which our defences
must be maintained? We have heard a lot recently about
how the picture has changed in the aftermath of the INF
agreement. . . . We are also hearing voices now which
explain that the threat itself has changed. Here, I think,
we must pause to reflect for a moment. 1
1 Manfred Worner, "NATO in the post-INF era: More opportunities than
risks," NATO REVIEW (August, 1988), 5.
22
A moment of reflection on the changing character of European
public opinion on defense questions does indeed seem to be in order.
The picture seems clear enough. Among large segments of the
general public, there is a perception that the worst days of the Cold
War are now irrevocably gone, and thus there is little reason to
tolerate the levels of defence expenditures that may have seemed
necessary in the past. Denmark's Politiken spoke for many when it
labeled the INF treaty an "epoch-making agreement" that could
symbolize "the beginnings of a new period of detente." Even more
conservative European organs of opinion have joined in this chorus of
optimism. Thus the Belgian Catholic newspaper Gazet van
Antwerpen opined that the Washington summit which witnessed the
signing of the INF treaty was not mainly about the treaty itself but
about "a new period of detente." The Italian II Messaggero
announced that "a new wind of international detente is blowing from
Washington toward the rest of the world." According to opinion
surveys, opposition to the INF treaty in the four major NATO
countries in Europe did not exceed 12 percent"!
These upbeat assessments are particularly evident in the one
country that is of particular criticality to NATO's whole strategic
posture: the Federal F apublic of Germany. Recent polls indicate,
for example, that fewer than one-third of the West Germans believe
that their security is still tied to the presence of American nuclear
weapons on their soil. Even more striking is the wide-spread view
1 Hugh De Santis, "After INF: the Political-Military Landscape of
Europe," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY (Summer, 1988), 30-31.
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in the FRG that their "security" is actually not even a matter of
justified concern. An opinion poll for the West German defence
ministry conducted by the Emnid Institute found that defence of the
FRG from external threats ranked dead last of seventeen "social
concerns". The poll showed defence expenditures to be less popular
than at any time since the Institute began polling in 1962. A full
75% of those questioned responded that the Soviet threat was not to
be taken seriously. 1 In a worried response to these findings,
former Bonn Defense Minister Rupert Scholz promised that the
government would take the offensive in educating an "insecure
public" on the necessity of continued vigilance and appropriate
defence planning. Somewhat plaintively, Mr. Scholz said that he
regretted "that West Germans are losing sight of the need for
further defense efforts."2
The above picture of the state of European opinion after INF
has to be balanced against the fact that among political and military
elites in Western Europe, there is, as might be expected, a somewhat
more measured attitude toward the current WTO threat and the
necessity of continued upgrading of NATO defense capabilities. In
fact, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud stated at one point that
an INF treaty based on "double-zero" would be in effect a "nuclear
Munich" creating a serious gap in the Western security posture. The
government of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain also expressed
1
"West Germans 'going soft* on defence issues," LONDON SUNDAY
TIMES (December 18, 1988), 19.
2john England, "Wave of anti-defense feeling worries Bonn,"
WASHINGTON TIMES (December 15, 1988), 9.
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some reservations about the implications of double-zero, although
not in such flamboyant language as Monsieur Giraud employed. Even
in West Germany, about a third of the combined CDU/CSU
parliamentary deputies announced opposition to including shorter-
range nuclear missiles (500 to 1000 kilometer range) in the
proposed accord, as was eventually done. 1
In time, of course, even the more skeptical European elites
came to support ratification of the INF treaty in its final form, at
least by tactful silence if not open enthusiasm. The point remains,
however, that there is a potentially serious schism between various
informed voices in Western Europe on future NATO security options
and those of the mass publics. Given the fact that all the NATO
countries are functioning democracies, it remains to be seen how or
to what degree the relevant governments will be able to resist the
general sentiments extant concerning the decline or even end of the
military confrontation in Europe. At the very least, Washington
will have to weigh carefully how productive to the long-term
cohesion of the Alliance it will be to insist on allied governments
following through on force modernization at the potential expense of
their domestic political standing (a point to be considered in greater
detail b "ow).
The Changing Soviet Image
Intimately related to the changes in European opinion detailed
above is, of course, what can only be called the masterly public
"Jonathan Dean, "The INF Agreement: Pluses and Minuses for Western
Security," ARMS CONTROL TODAY (July/August, 1987), 3.
25
relations offensive which General Secretary Gorbachev and other
Soviet leaders have conducted to persuade the West European publics
that there is indeed a new attitude and philosophy in Soviet foreign
and defense policy (for example, Gorbachev's continual reference to
a "common European house" in which the interests and security of
both East and West are intertwined). Western specialists may
question the breadth and sincerity of these protestations, but it
would be idle to deny that they have had a substantial impact on
targetted opinion in Western Europe-and in the United States as
well, where a recent Gallup poll revealed that 62% of those
questioned had a "favorable" view of the Soviet Union, compared to
only 21% in 1976. 1
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to submit Soviet "new
thinking" on defense policy to a detailed and rigorous exegesis, but
it is appropriate to focus briefly on the main tenets of that thinking
as they have been explained to foreign audiences. The key concepts
being advanced are "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive
defense". 2 Soviet references to reasonable sufficiency have
involved both the strategic nuclear balance between the super-
powers and the conventional theater balance between NATO and the
WTO. With respect to central strategic systems, Moscow has said
that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency should allow deep cuts in
1 SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (April 6, 1989), A22.
^The notion of "reasonable sufficiency" was first introduced by
Gorbachev in 1985 and he expanded on it at the 27th Party Congress
in February, 1986. See M.S. Gorbachev, "Political Report of the CPSU
Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the CPSU," PRAVDA
(February, 1986).
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both side's strategic arsenals, and that the underlying premise of
the doctrine is to maintain what the Soviets see as the current
roughly equal numerical parity in strategic arms as well as each
party's capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on its adversary
in response to a first-strike. Ironically, Moscow now seems to have
appropriated the American doctrine of "mutual assured destruction"
(MAD) first enunciated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in
the 1960's. 1
As far as the conventional theater balance in Europe is
concerned, the Soviets claim that they want to reconfigure both
NATO and WTO forces so as to preclude a successful surprise attack
by either side. Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, past Chief of Staff of
the Soviet Armed Forces, defined this new "defensive doctrine" as
meaning that the Soviet Union would defend against an attack for
about twenty days, during which time Moscow would attempt to
negotiate a resolution to the conflict. Should that effort fail, the
WTO would then launch a counteroffensive to win the war. 2 Farther
down the road, the ostensible Soviet goal is to eliminate the
possibility of mounting offensive operations at all, at which point
both alliances would be committed to the concept of a strictly
"defensive defence". In a presumed effort to demonstrate his bona
fides in this respect, Secretary-General Gorbachev announced to the
U.N. General Assembly on December 7, 1988 that the Soviet Union
1 Edward Warner III, "New thinking and old realities in Soviet
defence policy," SURVIVAL (January-February, 1989), 18-22.
2General William E. Odom, "The Kremlin's Strategy to De-Nuclearize
NATO," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE (March, 1989), 42.
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planned unilateral reductions of its forces in Eastern Europe on the
order of six tank divisions, 5000 tanks, and 50,000 personnel, with
an overall cut in the Soviet armed forces of 500,000 men. At the
same time he pledged a reduction of 10,000 tanks, 8500 artilery
systems and 800 combat aircraft from Soviet forces west of the
Urals. 1
A leading Western analyst of Soviet thinking on military
doctrine suggests that these ideas are in fact "revolutionary" ones
for the Soviets because they reflect a changed Marxist-Leninist
interpretation concerning the likely nature of a future war. He
argues that the two concepts actually predate the Gorbachev era,
going back to the early 1980's, when Marshal Nokolai Ogarkov first
pointed out that changes in weapons technology had fundamentally
altered scenarios for a land war in Europe. On this basis, "new
thinkers" in the Soviet defense establishment developed a rationale
for unilateral arms reductions on the part of the Soviet Union.
While in the beginning the institutional implications of reorganizing
Soviet forces around a doctrine of "defense-only" defense was not
fully appreciated by the professional military, they may now have no
choice but to go along with the new policy. 2
Perhaps a somewhat more balanced, or at least skeptical,
analysis of new Soviet thinking on military policy argues that such
thinking has basically constituted a tool "for gaining hold of the
"•NEW YORK TIMES (December 8, 1987), A16.
2 Michael MccGwire, "Rethinking War: The Soviets and European
Security," THE BROOKINGS REVIEW (Spring, 1988). See also
MccGwire's piece, "Update: Soviet Military Objectives," WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL (Fall, 1987).
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Soviet defense agenda," that is, providing the civilian party elite
with a much greater hold over the development of security policy,
which in the past has been largely the preserve of the uniformed
military. The further argument is that any possibility of translating
such ideas into viable and enduring defense policy is dependent on
how well Gorbachev manages to institutionalize the reform ethos of
perestroika. 1
Aside from the utility of "new thinking" on security matters in
supporting Gorbachev's efforts to consolidate his power and pursue
his domestic concerns, the question remains as to whether
operationally the deployment and structuring of the Soviet armed
forces in the European theater has to date reflected the ostensible
switch in Soviet military doctrine. To be sure the announced
unilateral withdrawal of tanks and personnel, along with supporting
systems such as bridging equipment, does have some significance,
particularly in terms of their lessening of WTO blitzkrieg
capabilities. At the same time, devotion to the concept of massive
offensive operations at the outbreak of hostilities is a time-honored
one in the Soviet military, and recently recast organizational
arrangements for theater warfare and the modernization of various
weapons systems related to such conflict legitimately give one
pause. Particularly troublesome is the continued Soviet insistence
"•Stephen Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New
Political Thinking on Security," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 13 (Fall,
1988). See also Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the
Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," ORBIS (Summer, 1986) and
Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY (Summer, 1988).
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that a WTO capability for extensive offensive operations is fully
consistent with "defensive defence" (again a deeply-entrenched idea
in Soviet military thinking). 1 Pushed to its logical conclusion, and
especially from the NATO perspective, the putative new emphasis on
reasonable sufficiency and defensive defence may seem to be a
distinction without a difference in terms of the real WTO threat.
Nevertheless, there is no question but that the debate over
evolving Soviet military doctrine is not simply the preserve of the
defense professionals in the West but has entered significantly into
the broader public domain. In this sense, arguments about the
actual reality of the new Soviet stance, while far from unimportant,
are only one aspect of the analysis that NATO must undertake.
Equally salient are the perspectives of Western publics and how this
may translate into political pressure on the relevant leadership to
accept that the WTO challenge has changed in a measurable way,
with all the implications this has for the defense posture of the
West.
1 For some critical and skeptical analyses about the real
significance of Soviet "new thinking" on defense matters, see
Gerhard Wettig, '"New Thinking' on Security and East-West
Relations," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (March-April, 1988), and Leon
Goure, "A "New" Soviet Military Doctrine: Reality or Mirage?"
STRATEGIC REVIEW (Summer, 1988).
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Coupling and Cohesion
We have noted that an overwhelming majority of West
European public opinion is on record as supporting the "double-zero"
provisions of the INF treaty. At the same time, as also discussed,
an important minority of West Europeans, particularly those with
some professional interest or involvement in NATO defense planning,
have at least tacit or implicit concerns about what the treaty means
for the long-term American commitment to European security. Put
bluntly, the fear is that ratification of the INF accord may well be
the first step in the eventual "de-coupling" of the United States
from Europe, or at least a dimunition of American willingness to put
its own homeland at risk in order to defend Europe. As one
experienced American arms control negotiator has put it, "the main
problem raised by [the] INF agreement is neither a military nor an
East-West one. It is a West-West one of dealing with the damage
done to the confidence of an important minority of Western
Europeans in the reliability of U.S. help in a crisis with the Soviet
Union." 1
As we have discussed above, the primary reason for the
decision to deploy Pershing-ll's and GLCM's in Western Europe
essentially had to do with political symbolism: these land-based
and thus quite visible systems represented a reaffirmation of the
connection between American and European security. They were
designed to constitute a link between American (and NATO) INF
1 Dean, "The INF Agreement," 10.
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assets and American central strategic systems, the latter being the
traditional ultimate guarantor of European safety from WTO
aggression. In the aftermath of the removal of the Pershing-ll's and
GLCM's, would Washington in a crisis be tempted to avoid its
ultimate commitment to Europe in the absence of the "triggering
mechanism" that these systems were designed to provide? Thus the
fears about de-coupling. It might be noted in this context that too
much can perhaps be made of the coupling function of American
nuclear weapons in Europe. The presence of some 300,000 American
troops on the continent together with dependents, not to mention
long-standing cultural, political and economic ties between the
United States and Western Europe, would seem in themselves to
provide the ultimate guarantor of an American commitment to a free
Europe
Fears about de-coupling, however misplaced, do impact
however on the long-term prospects for Alliance cohesion. If
important European elites conclude that the United States, if only
indirectly, is moving toward modification of its traditional NATO
security guarantees, this would logically lead to a reappraisal by
such elites as to the requirements for their countries's future
security. Such a reappraisal (in Secretary of State Dulles' famous
phrase, perhaps an "agonizing reppraisal") might well lead to
alternative models of European deterrence of the WTO, involving
either an attempt at further accomodation with the East
(perjoratively styled "Finlandization") or else a new emphasis on a
strictly Euro-strategic perspective, which would significantly
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downplay the American role in European defense. In either case,
NATO as an institution would be transformed in significant ways.
There is another aspect to this problem, however. Assuming
that the United States desires to take steps to re-emphasize the
coupling of its security with that of Western Europe, e.g., by
modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF), how can this be
effected without alienating that large body of West European opinion
which is already dubious about the benefits of the American nuclear
presence in Europe? European defense planners may well encourage
and even demand such measures, but as earlier noted they also have
to deal with pressures from their domestic constituencies. An
overly heavy-handed American insistence on new nuclear assets for
NATO deterrence may have the ironic effect of pleasing some in the
European defense ministries but fundamentally alienating mass
European opinion, with its own serious implications for alliance
cohesion. This is a connundrum that will challenge the subtlety and
imagination of American policy-makers.
Hardware and Politics
In dealing with the dilemma referred to above, Washington
broadly speaking has to steer a course between what might be c ''ed
"hardware solutions" to European security after INF and a more
general political strategy. A properly conceived policy
theoretically can combine elements of both, but it is important to
recognize that there is the continuing possibility of conflict
between the two elements.
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We have already referred to the "hardware" measures that have
been suggested or are now in the stage of implementation for
compensating for the removal of NATO nuclear assets under the INF
Treaty, including the stationing of F11G's in Britain with new ALCM
capabilities, deployment of B-52's to Europe also with ALCM's,
upgrading of the aging Lance short-range missile system, and the
formal assignment of American nuclear SLCM's to European defense.
All these have been presented as necessary to the maintenance of
NATO's strategy of flexible response and more broadly to "extended
deterrence" by the United States. One point that deserves mention
briefly here is whether the U.S. Navy would be entirely happy to have
substantial SLCM assets committed to European defense. In fact,
there is some resistance within Navy circles to such a posture since
it would appear to reduce the flexibility and availability of U.S.
naval forces for other missions out-of-area. 1
A more fundamental observation about the above set of
potential nuclear force add-ons to the NATO theater is that it will
be politically very important how such increments are justified. It
would in fact seem to be a serious mistake to speak in terms of such
increments as specific "compensation" for the INF treaty
drawdowns. Such an approach is bound to raise fears within
European public opinion about the fundamental commitment of the
United States to further arms control measures, i.e., certain
weapons systems are withdrawn only to be replaced by other
weapons systems. Assuaging such concerns is particularly
1 Lewis A. Dunn, "Considerations after the INF Treaty," SURVIVAL
(May-June, 1988), 195.
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important in view of the heightened expectations in Europe
concerning future progress in arms control created by the successful
conclusion of the INF accord. Instead, both nuclear as well as
conventional force modernization should be presented in terms of
maintaining the European balance and basic Alliance security
interests. 1
The Conventional Balance
A major consideration in any plan for future NATO force
allocations, particularly in terms of nuclear assets, clearly is the
current state of the conventional balance in Europe and how that
balance might be effected by the negotiations in Vienna over
conventional force reductions by NATO and the WTO. Dating back for
a number of years, NATO's nuclear capabilities have been seen as
critical in offsetting a large advantage for the WTO in various areas
of conventional arms and manpower. To the extent that this
advantage can be mitigated, perhaps partly through unilateral
actions on the part of Gorbachev (such as his announcement that
Moscow would shortly withdraw four Soviet armored divisions from
East Germany and one from Czechoslovakia) but more realistically
through a negotiated agreement at Vienna "n reductions of
NATO/WTO conventional assets, the debate over necessary
conventional and nuclear NATO capabilities is bound to be impacted.
There seems no question but that in sheer numerical terms the
WTO has impressive superiority in various categories of
1 De Santis, "After INF," 43.
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conventional weapons. Thus the Pact enjoys about a two-to-one
advantage in main battle tanks, three-to-one in self-propelled
artillery, two-to-one in attack helicopters, and five-to-one in
fighter-interceptor aircraft. 1 Given these numbers, SACEUR
General John Galvin has stated publically that NATO would be able to
defend itself against an all-out WTO attack for only about two
weeks, at which point it would be necessary to resort to nuclear
weapons. 2
Other analyses are rather less alarmist than that of General
Galvin's, and in fact there is considerable disagreement over how
one factors in both quantitative and qualitative factors in gauging
the true relationship of forces in the European theater. Thus it is
generally accepted that NATO's tactical fighters far exceed those of
the WTO in general capability and that the quality of the Leopard II
and M-1 tanks certainly is better than equivalent armor in the WTO,
particularly in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armored divisions. On
the qualitative side, it is often asserted that NATO has a distinct
1 1nternational Institute for Strategic Studies, THE MILITARY
BALANCE 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988). See also U.S.,
Department of State, CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE: THE FACTS
(Washington: GPO, November 25, 1988). An interesting development
with respect to the debate over the conventional balance has been
the recent WTO decision to issue its own assessment in considerable
detail of the balance of forces (which had been resisted for a number
of years). Not surprisingly, the WTO analysis is that there is a
"rough parity" between NATO and WTO forces which "denies either
side any hope of achieving a decisive military superiority."
STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE MINISTERS OF DEFENCE OF THE
WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES (Dresden: German Democratic
Republic, 1989).
2ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL (March, 1988), 50.
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advantage in terms of levels of training of its troops, their morale,
and, by contrast, the perhaps doubtful reliability of various East
European units in any general WTO offensive against the WestJ
Perhaps the fairest overall assessment is offered .by the
respected International Institute for Strategic Studies in its latest
assessment of the military balance in Europe. The IISS continues to
suggest that a "general military aggression in Europe would be a
high-risk option with unpredictable consequences." They do go on to
note, however, that the spectre of "high risk" has not deterred resort
to war in the past, nor would it necessarily do so in the Europe of
the future. Moreover, force developments in the recent past have
done little to assuage NATO concerns about a conventional
imbalance, and in hardware terms the situation indeed may have
grown even less favorable. Perhaps most ominously, the IISS argues
that there is little evidence to date of any "discernible force
structuring, equipment or training developments in the Atlantic-to-
Urals area to support Soviet claims of 'new thinking' involving
'reasonable sufficiency' and defensive defence concepts." Indeed,
WTO forces continue, at least from the NATO perspective, to be
configured and deployed in a manner that favors high-speed, short-
warning offensive (or counter-offe" ^ive) operations. 2
1 For a useful summary of the various points of view and differing
types of data to be considered in arriving at a judgement on the
European conventional balance, see "Policy Focus: The European
Conventional Balance," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 12 (Spring, 1988)
as well as "Conventional Wisdom and the Conventional Balance,"
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 13 (Summer, 1988).
2 IISS, THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 1988-1989, 235. There have been
several other recent attempts to assess the overall conventional
37
Whatever position one adopts toward the conventional military
balance in Europe, it is clear that judgments on this matter will play
a heavy role in considerations concerning NATO's security posture
after the INF treaty. The current Conventional Forces in Europe talks
(CFE) in Vienna, which are charged with achieving a NATO/WTO
agreement on the restructuring and lowering of force levels by both
sides in Europe, are also of obvious relevance in this regard.
Considering the fact that the predecessor to the CFE, the Mutual and
Balance Force Reduction Talks (MBFR), proceeded for a number of
years with little discernible success, one might be justified in
expressing some skepticism that the CFE will provide any immediate
relief for Western concerns about WTO superiority in various
categories of conventional forces. 1
Nevertheless, the Vienna negotiations do seem to be starting
out in an atmosphere distinctly more conducive to a potential
agreement than was the case with the late and unlamented MBFR
negotiations. Thus initial proposals from both sides were based on
certain common and critical premises, including the principle of
equal limits on key weapons, the general size of the arms
military balance in Europe that are of interest here. See, for
example, James Thomson, AN UNFAVORABLE SITUATION: NATO AND
THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. N-2842-FF/RC (Santa Monica, CA: The
Rand Corporation, November, I988); United States, General
Accounting Office, NATO-WARSAW PACT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE (Washington: GPO, December, I988);
United States, Congress, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. GROUND
FORCES AND THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE (Washington:
GPO, June I988)
1 For a review of the MBFR negotiations, see Jonathan Dean, "Military
Security in Europe," FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Fall, 1987).
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reductions, and the need for intrusive verification measures. 1 The
broader political environment between East and West also seems to
be more conducive to an agreement than the earlier periods.
Nevertheless, serious obstacles remain before a CFE treaty can be
achieved, notably the Soviet proposal for partially demilitarized
zones along the East-West border, limits on aircraft, and the
relationship of naval forces to the talks (an area in which most
observers feel NATO has a distinct advantage).2
Perhaps the most judicious conclusion to be made at this point
is that a treaty on reducing and restructuring conventional forces in
Europe is definitely more within the realm of possibility today than
in the past, but that even in the best of circumstances it is unlikely
to come soon enough to allow NATO to postpone important decisions
on the size, composition and quality of its nuclear and conventional
forces in the aftermath of INF. 3 As Ambassador Paul Nitze has
stated, NATO must avoid "the temptation to anticipate arms limits
and to adjust our force structuring and modernization plans
1 See the statement by Major-General G. Batenin in PRAVDA in
December, 1988, reproduced in WORLD PRESS REVIEW (December,
1988), 24. Also, Peter Almquist, "Moscow's Conventional Wisdom:
Soviet Views of the European Balance," ARMS CONTROL TODAY
(December, 1987).
2Michael Gordon, "Good Sign in Vienna," THE NEW YORK TIMES (March
7, 1989), A6. See also Secretary of State James Baker's address in
Vienna on March 6, 1989 in which he took a relatively optimistic
attitude toward the coming CFE negotiations. U.S., Department of
State, Secretary of State James Baker, "New Horizons in Europe"
(Washington: GPO, March, 1989).
3a good survey of the challenges facing the CFE negotiatiators is
Jack Snyder's "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces,"
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Spring, 1988).
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prematurely. Experience and logic teach us that such actions, by
reducing the other side's incenstives to pay a price for our
reductions, reduces the likelihood that the anticipated limits will
ever be established." 1
Burden-Sharing and European Defense Cooperation
To the extent that a substantial modernization and upgrading
of various NATO defense capabilities may be seen as necessary in
the aftermath of the elimination of INF assets, this raises two
additional relevant matters that should be referred to at least
briefly here. The first concerns the degree to which Washington
and/or its European partners in NATO can be expected to assume the
increased burden of expenditure for such measures. One estimate is
that within the United States's defense budget approximately $160
billion is directly tied to the defense of Europe (at the same time as
Washington faces a $25 billion trade deficit in its economic
relations with the European Community). Representative Andy
Ireland (R-FLA) spoke for many in Congress when he said recently
that "American tax dollars are spent to defend our allies who use the
money they save to cloober us in the trade wars. . . We can't go on as
though it's still 1949."2 In spite of this rather florid rheto-ic, it
still remains that the European members of NATO provide about 90%
1 Ambassador Paul Nitze, "Security and Arms Control-A number of
good beginnings," NATO REVIEW (December, 1988), 3. See also Karl
Kaiser, "Objectives, Concepts and Policies for Conventional Arms
Reductions," ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY 26 (Spring, 1988).
2SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (April 5, 1989), Z7-4.
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of the Alliance's artillery, 80% of its combat aircraft, 80% of its
tanks, 65% of its warships and 90% of its manpower. 1
In an effort to deal with the burden-sharing issue, NATO
defense ministers for the first time in the history of the Alliance
issued a report in December, 1988 analyzing what each country
contributed to the common defense and recommending what else
each should do. Entitled "Enhancing Alliance Collective Security",
the document stressed both the quantitiative and qualitative
contributions of NATO members. Among the major actions proposed
by the report and approved by the Ministers was an agreement on
financing for the transfer of the U.S. 401st Tactical Fighter Wing
from Spain to Italy, creation of a new joint force for the defence of
Norway, acceptance of the Spanish roles in overall NATO defence
strategy, and other moves to improve defence levels and industries
in NATO's southern region countries. 2SACEUR General John Galvin
commented that "Congress will not be ecstatic about this report, but
it will realize that Europe is indeed doing its best. "3
NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner rightly argues that
"the broad political concept of sharing benefits and responsibilities
is of the greatest importance here. The benefits . . . are inseparable
from he willingness to assume the responsibilities which produce
those benefits."4
1 U.S., Department of State, WESTERN DEFENSE: THE EUROPEAN ROLE
IN NATO. An analysis by the Eurogroup. (Brussels: May, 1988), 10.
2JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY (December 10, 1988(, 1446.
3ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL (January, 1989), 44.
4Woerner, "NATO in the post-INF era," 3.
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Despite the wisdom of this position, however, the evidence strongly
suggests that in an era of heavy Federal deficits in the United
States, and constraints on European defense spending caused in
substantial measure by large social welfare costs, the prospect of
increasing defense budgets to support military force upgrades is dim
at best for any of the parties. One may criticize this fact as
representing a rather irresponsible unwillingness to face the
requirements for conventional NATO forces in the aftermath of INF,
but as a political reality it has to be squarely confronted. The
logical conclusion is that decisions on force posture for NATO for
the foreseeable future will have to derive out of a consideration of
how to share out and perhaps reallocate the current level of
resources available (or even a lessening of such resources). 1
American Congressional demands that the Europeans assume a
greater portion of the burden of deterring WTO aggression are likely
not only to be unavailing but will exacerbate the already-existing
tension between Washington and her NATO partners on strategy for
the coming years.2
1 For various perspectives on the burden-sharing issue, see Giovanni
Jannuzzi, "The Political and Economic Aspects of European Security,"
THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR (January-March, 1988) and Daniel
Nelson and Joseph Leopold, "Alliances and Burden-Sharing: A NATO-
Warsaw Pact Comparison," DEFENSE ANALYSIS 2 (1986).
2A good example of the dangers here was the proposed amendment to
the defence appropriations bill for FY 1989 which would have
required the Europeans to assume added expenditures for American
ground forces in Europe following a freeze by the United States on
the payment of such costs. British leader Margaret Thatcher was
particularly vehement in her denunciation of this proposed
legislation. "Senato vote threatens NATO defences," LONDON
SUNDAY TIMES (July 31, 1988), 1.
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In theory whatever "gaps" may have been created in NATO's
deterrent posture by the INF treaty might be at least mitigated by
increasing intra-European cooperation on weapons procurement,
R&D, and coordination of force deployments and doctrine. As one
European analyst has put it, "The concept of a 'European Defense
Pillar' equal in importance and responsibility to the U.S. has become
fashionable in NATO circles." 1 A report by the North Atlantic
Assembly puts the basic case:
A fundamental change has occurred in the US-European
relationship, reflecting the gradual, relative increase in
the economic strength and political potential of the West
European members of the Alliance. Because of this
change, the West European Allies should in the future
share more effectively the political, economic and
military responsibilities of Western defence and
Alliance leadership. 2
Specific measures that have been proposed in this context do
not represent a panacea for Western security, but could nevertheless
prove useful. There are some steps that have been taken in this
direction already, notably a statement by French Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac that France's military assistance to West Germany
would be "immediate and without reservation" if war erupted in
Europe. "There cannot be a battle for Germany and a battle for
France. "3
1 Hella Pick, "Can Europe BE Separate but Equal?" THE GUARDIAN
(reprinted in WORLD PRESS REVIEW (December, 1988), 22.
2 North Atlantic Assembly, NATO IN THE 1990'S (Brussels: May,
1988), 11.
3James Markham, "Germans' Defense Pledged by Paris," THE NEW
YORK TIMES (December 21, 1987), A11.
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This seemed to represent a repudiation of the long-standing
French position that she would reserve to herself any decision on
involvement in a European military confrontation and by implication
would stand aloof from an initial conventional struggle between
NATO and the WTO. Moreover, the prospective deployment of the
French Hades missile in 1991, with a range of about 450 kilometers,
as well as development of the longer-range S-4 missile, may be seen
as partially filling the gap left by the withdrawal of the American
Pershing-ll and GLCM. There is also the much-remarked formation
of a joint 4200-man French-German brigade equipped with tanks and
artillery, plans for a 15000-man all European division, as well as
preliminary discussions between London and Paris on the
development of a new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) to be
deployed on the British Toronado and the French Mirage. 1 Moreover,
the French have opened talks with NATO officials on formal
participation by France in the Alliance's new air defense and
command system scheduled to become operational in 1991.2
Of some potential significance here may be the recent
revitalization of the long-dormant Western European Union (WEU),
which has been interpreted as a response to fears about an American
1
"UK and France to Talk on N-missiles," FINANCIAL TIMES (December
14, 1987), 20. See also David Yost, "Franco-German Defense
Cooperation," THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY (Spring, 1988).
2Edward Cody, "France Moves to Join New NATO Defense Unit,"
WASHINGTON POST (February 9, 1989), 29. All these steps have
persuaded some that France is now at the forefront of European
countries in its concern and firmness concerning the WTO threat.
John Fialka, "French Are Emerging as the Hawks of Western Europe,"
WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 7, 1988), 19.
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conventional or nuclear disengagement from Western Europe, and an
accompanying conviction that Europeans must at least in part see to
their own collective security needs in a strictly European forum. As
the WEU has recently stated, "We are resolved to strengthen the
European pillar of the Alliance." 1 Moreover, the European
Community's plan to restructure itself into a unified economic bloc
by 1992-eliminating almost all internal barriers to trade and
finance—may well foreshadow the creation of an impressive
economic powerhouse that presumably would have important
implications for Europe's contribution to its own security.
These are tentative and perhaps promising steps in the
direction of greater European co-ordination on defense, but once
again it is well not to exaggerate their capacity for filling whatever
"gaps" may have been created by the INF treaty. At best, such
measures should be seen as only one aspect of a broader approach to
insuring NATO's capabilities to deter the WTO in the coming years.
The Arms Control Agenda
Finally, there is the overarching question of how NATO
decisions on nuclear and conventional force postures will impact on,
and in turn be effected by, the ongoing arms control negotiations
currently being conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union
as well as their partners in the two respective alliances. We have
already referred to the CFE discussions in Vienna, and there are the
START negotiations as well between Moscow and Washington. In our
1 Western European Union, "Platform on European Security Interests,"
(The Hague: WEU, October 27, 1987).
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subsequent analysis we will be referring in some detail to the
interaction between arms control concerns and the deployment of
military assets in the European theater after INF. At this point,
therefore, it is only necessary to reiterate that popular expectations
in all of the Western societies concerning the possibilities of more
arms agreements are perhaps at their highest pitch since the
beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940's. As noted, such
optimism has been fueled in part by the successful INF agreement
and also in considerable measure by the skillful public relations
diplomacy of General Secretary Gorbachev. 1
With respect to START, considerable progress has already been
made at Geneva on the outlines of a treaty. An agreement in
principle has been made to cut strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent.
The draft treaty establishes a limit of 6000 warheads on 1600
strategic offensive delivery systems, including ICBM's, SLBM's, and
ALCM's. Each heavy bomber with gravity bombs and short-range
attack missiles (SRAM's) would equal one warhead and one delivery
system. The document also establishes a sublimit of 4900
strategic ballistic missile warheads (ICBM and SLBM). Left
unresolved are American proposals to limit overall throw-weight in
the two sides' arsenals as well as a limit or outright ban on mobile
missiles, and Soviet demands for ceilings on SLCM's. Moreover,
1 A good (and concerned) review of the atmosphere surrounding the
current START talks is Richard Golik, "In Search of START," JOURNAL
OF DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY (September, 1988).
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there are numerous details to be worked out on a possible
verification regime for a START agreement. 1
Whether the question is the conclusion of START or of a CFE
treaty, the relevant NATO leadership is going to be under
considerable pressure in the coming period to be seen as
"forthcoming" and conciliatory in its arms control stance vis-a-vis
the WTO. The problem is that various weapons systems and force
modernization schemes seen as necessary by many informed Western
military analysts may constitute potentially serious obstacles to
any arms control regime, particularly in terms of reliable
verification of the terms of agreement. The question that will
likely loom large for Western statesmen then is whether to push
ahead with arms control measures even at the potential sacrifice of
security measures that may in their own terms be highly desirable,
or whether to ignore or at least deflect public pressures for arms
agreements in the interests of going ahead with such measures. The
challenge is especially acute here in that a START agreement
inevitably would have far more significant impact on the East-West
military balance and on the stability of that balance than the
relatively limited terms of the INF treaty. 2 This is not an enviable
situation for those concerned, and it is far too early to say what the
overall direction of decision will be for the Alliance at this point.
1 Robert Einhorn, "The emerging START agreement," SURVIVAL
(September/October, 1988). For American resistance to the Soviet
proposal on SLCM's, see Ambassador Paul Nitze, "Security and Arms
Control", NATO REVIEW (December, 1988).
2 Barry Schneider and Michael Ennis, "When Is It Safe to Say DA?"
JOURNAL OF DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY (October, 1988).
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It is safe to say, however, that the dilemma presented here will
perhaps constitute one of the most serious and demanding policy
challenges to face NATO since its inception in 1949.
In the following sections of this analysis, we will focus on
two specific areas in which the above conflict between potentially
important force deployments for NATO deterrence and the pressures
for arms control success are particularly pronounced. The first
concerns the Alliance's maritime nuclear assets and strategy, the
second deals with the question of the modernization of NATO's land-
based short-range nuclear forces. Both of these are obviously of
central importance to the ongoing relationship between NATO's
nuclear assets and its continued ability to discourage WTO
aggression.
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NATO'S NUCLEAR ASSETS AT SEA
In the aftermath of the signing of the INF treaty, there were
various suggestions advanced as to how NATO generally and the
United States specifically might develop new assets, doctrine and
strategy to reflect the changed security environment in Europe with
the gradual elimination of the American Pershing-U's and GLCM's.
One of the principal contributions to this debate came from those
who foresaw a much more important role for the U.S. Navy in NATO
strategy and especially for the Navy's nuclear sea-launched cruise-
missile (SLCM) capabilities. As one spokesman for this point of
view put it, "The Navy may well be called upon to solve both the
military and political problems presented by an INF agreement. . . .
TLAM/N [Tomahawk land-attack missile/nuclear] has been criticized
as a weapon in search of a mission. The INF role could answer that
criticism. TLAM/N is the only system that could truly fill the
deterrent role provided by the P-ll's and GLCM's." 1
In fact NATO defense ministers in April, 1988 formally
considered the possibility of substituting TLAM/N for the w apons
systems proscribed by the INF Treaty (a decision was set aside
pending an agreement on modernization of NATO land-based short
range nuclear forces). It is reported, however, that the American
1 James L. George, "l(N)NF," PROCEEDINGS (June, 1987), 37-38.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff favor such an approach themselves. 1 An
important argument in favor of TLAM/N as a substitute for the loss
of NATO assets dictated by the INF treaty is that this weapons
system would help to sustain the Alliance's flexible response
strategy, which emphasizes the use of non-strategic nuclear
weapons to link the conventional defense of Europe to the U.S.
central strategic arsenal. The Tomahawk is ideal for this mission,
it is asserted, because it is capable of striking targets in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union itself, can be employed in a flexible
manner, and has a high survivability potential.2
Differing analyses of the so-called "maritime strategy" and its
future contribution to European security in the post-INF era provide
the broader framework within which the debate over American
nuclear SLCM's have proceeded, but our focus here will be
specifically on the issue of the TLAM/N and its present and future
relevance to NATO deterrence of WTO aggression.
3
Background
1 Strobe Talbott, "Why START Stopped," FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Fall,
1988), 63.
2 Linton Brooks, "Nuclear SLCM's Add to Deterrence and Security,"
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Winter, 1988-89), 171.
3For contrasting views on the maritime strategy generally, see John
Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," and Linton Brooks, "Naval Power
and National Security," both in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 11 (Fall,
1986), 3-88. See also Francis J. West, Jr., "After the INF Treaty the
Maritime Strategy Should Become More Important Than Ever," NAVY
(January, 1988).
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The development and evolution of the U.S. Navy's sea-launched
cruise missile capability has hardly proceeded on a steady or even
course over the past several decades. Indeed work on this
particular weapons system has been characterized by various stops
and starts, ambiguity and controversy over its strategic versus
tactical missions, technical difficulties in the research-and-
development process, and a steady drumbeat of criticism from
various quarters, Congressional and otherwise, as to the whole
rationale of the SLCM program, particularly those cruise missiles
with nuclear warheads. 1 A review of these matters is necessary in
any attempt to assess the role of the SLCM in the post-INF Treaty
security situation in Europe.
The earliest attempt by the Navy to develop a cruise missile
capability was the Regulus program launched in the 1950's. The
Regulus I and II were nuclear land attack weapons designed to
supplement the Navy's nuclear attack assets from carrier-based
aircraft. For a variety of reasons, including the advent of the
Polaris submarine in the early 1960's, the Regulus program faded out
and for a period of time there was little attention given to the SLCM
as a U.S. naval asset.2 Attitudes began to change, however,
following the 1967 Middle East war, when .e Egyptians used a
1 Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of
Cruise Missile Development 1970-1980," in Richard K. Betts, ed.,
CRUISE MISSILES: TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY, POLITICS (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1981), 379-393. For another analysis of
the development of cruise missile technology, see Kosta Tsipis,
"Cruise Missiles," SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (February, 1977).
2Commander Miles A. Libbey III, "Tomahawk", PROCEEDINGS (May,
1984), 152.
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Soviet-made SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile to sink the Israeli
destroyer Eilat . 1 Renewed Navy interest in the potential of SLCM's
led to the formal adoption of the Tomahawk cruise missile program
in 1972.2 One account has it that National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger played a key role in giving impetus to the Tomahawk's
development, not so much because he was necessarily impressed
with its potential capabilities but rather because he wanted an
additional bargaining chip to be traded away in the second stage of
the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Whatever the truth of this allegation, the Tomahawk SLCM
program moved fitfully forward from that period and after some
thirteen years of development has evolved into a system that
features four distinct variants: a nuclear-armed land attack missile
(TLAM/N), a conventionally-armed land
attack missile (TLAM/C), a conventionally-armed anti-ship missile
(TASM) and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that was part
of the INF upgrade already discussed. 3
The sea-launched versions of the Tomahawk were all
deliberately configured so that they could be launched from the
torpedo tubes of the Navy's attack submarines. In addition the plan
1 Dan Smuckler, "Sea-Skimming Missiles," JOURNAL OF DEFENSE AND
DIPLOMACY (December, 1988), 44.
2A.M. Bowen and R. O'Rourke, "The Tomahawk Cruise Missile," NAVAL
FORCES No. IV (1985), 94.
3|_t. Kenneth Keller, "Tomahawk: The Warrior's Weapon," SURFACE
WARFARE (November/December, 1986), 3. For the development of
the land-attack version of the Tomahawk, see Rose E. Gottmoeller,
LAND-ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES, Adelphi Paper No. 226 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1987/1988).
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was for Los Angeles class boats to be fitted with vertical launching
systems (VLS) on their front end to allow a second mode of firing.
The Tomahawk was also designed to be fired from surface platforms.
A VLS capability was to be backfitted on 24 Spruance class
destroyers and installed as original equipment on Ticonderoga class
cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
Both the Iowa and New Jersey battleships were to receive the
system as well. An additional mode of firing the Tomahawk from
surface ships is the armoured box launcher (ABM), which in effect is
bolted onto the ship's deck and elevated for launch purposes. The
Navy's plan was for about two-thirds of the TLAM's, both nuclear and
conventional, to be deployed on surface ships, with the remainder on
attack submarines.
The Tomahawk flies at sub-sonic speeds (open sources
indicate a maximum cruising speed of about 540 miles per hour) and
has a range of approximately 1350 nautical miles for the TLAM/N
and between 675 and 475 nautical miles for the TLAM/C, depending
on whether it is fired from surface ships or submarines. The
technical virtuosity of its guidance systems give the TLAM/N (the
primary focus of this analysis) a reported capacity to come within
one hundred feet of the desk ated target. The warhead on the
TLAM/N is reported to be in the range of about 200 kilotons.
As of the date of initial deployment of the Tomahawk in 1984,
the U.S. Navy projected a total procurement of 3994 of these
systems, of which 758 would be the TLAM/N (deployment to be
completed by the mid-1 990's). Plans were to have a total of 198
attack submarines and surface platforms equipped for firing this
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particular missile (as of mid-1988, 32 submarines and 24 surface
ships had been so equipped). 1 This brief discussion of the
technical characteristics of the Tomahawk program, however, hardly
conveys any sense of the complexity of the debate over this
particular weapons system. As noted earlier, the Tomahawks, and
in particular the TLAM/N, have in fact been the occasion for an
extremely heated debate over the actual mission that these weapons
can perform, their impact on arms control negotiations, their role in
(or threat to) crisis stability, and in general the mix of
opportunities and risks that they present. It is necessary to take a
close look at these matters, given the fact that the TLAM/N
ostensibly could be regarded as being well-placed to assume some of
the missions and roles of those weapons that are to be withdrawn
from Europe under terms of the INF treaty.
MISSIONS
Given its technical characteristics, in particular the fact that
it flies at sub-sonic speeds, the TLAM/N is not a particularly
suitable weapon system for attacking time-urgent enemy targets,
such as missile sites or C^. Instead, its utility may be summarized
in terms of its capacity "for attacking fixed, heavily defended, high-
value targets where time is not of the essence and the use of
ballistic missiles or manned aircraft is deemed politically
imprudent or technically risky. "2 This assessment conveniently
1 Alva Bowen, NAVY NUCLEAR ARMED TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, September, 1985), 2
2Bowen and O'Rourke, "The Tomahawk Cruise Missile," 96.
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touches on several of the advantages which supporters of the
TLAM/N say the weapon offers, in particular its capacity for sparing
naval airmen from excessively high-risk missions against critical
targets as well as its being theoretically less "provocative" since it
is not part of American central strategic systems and thus would be
less conducive to Soviet escalation to a strategic exchange
following its use.
The overall case for the nuclear Tomahawk can be summarized
by reference to a series of inter-related propositions. It is argued,
for example, that acquisition of the system greatly increases the
flexibility and effectiveness of the Navy's nuclear striking power
ashore. Instead of theater nuclear assets being concentrated on
fourteen aircraft carriers (as well as the SLBM warheads dedicated
to Saceur), the Navy will potentially have almost 200 nuclear strike
platforms at their disposal. This will allow targeting of Soviet
assets currently not within the Navy's strike capabilities as well as
stretching Soviet defenses against such strikes beyond their
effective capacity. By dispersing our naval nuclear deterrent
amongst so many platforms, moreover, it will become virtually
impossible for the Soviets to eliminate the American nuclear
maritime retalial ,y capability."' Also of considerable importance
to the case for TLAM/N deployment is this system's contribution to
the American strategic nuclear reserve, those assets that can be
1 Norman Friedman, "World Naval Developments," PROCEEDINGS
(February, 1988), 119; U.S., Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1982. Ninety-seventh Congress, First session, 1981,
1651.
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counted on to survive an initial nuclear exchange and remain
available for follow-on missions after such an exchange. 1 Finally,
stress is placed on the relatively low cost of the nuclear
Tomahawk-around $3 million per missile, compared to $70 million
for, say, the MX missile. Seen from this perspective, the TLAM/N
adds a great deal to the deterrent capabilities of the United States
generally and the Navy specifically, and at a remarkably modest
outlay. 2
Examined more closely in terms of its contribution to NATO
security, the TLAM/N in fact could be assigned to any one of four
distinct missions: a strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or
her allies, an attack on WTO naval support facilities and maritime
air bases, support for the general land battle in Europe, and support
for amphibious landings. 3 Given the time it would take the TLAM/N
to reach targets in the Soviet Union, the strategic attack mission
may be questioned, although the weapon's extreme accuracy does
make it suitable for destroying hardened strategic targets. Whether
the TLAM/N is really needed for the second mission (destruction of
WTO maritime assets) is also perhaps problematical, since these
1 On the "strategic reserve" role for the TLAM/N, see the statement
by Rear Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Director of the Strategic Submarine
Division of the Navy to the Senate's Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, STRATEGIC
FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, Ninety-seventh Congress, First
Session, 1981, 203.
^Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "The Tomahawk Missile and Nato
Strategy," in NATO'S MARITIME STRATEGY: ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), 53-54.
3United States.Joint Chiefs of Staff, STATEMENT ON US MILITARY
POSTURE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1981), 78.
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targets have presumably been covered in Single Integrated
Operational Plans (SIOP's) drawn up before the advent of the
Tomahawk. The utility of the TLAM/N for the final two missions
also is a matter of some controversy, especially with respect to the
residual radioactivity and associated destruction which such use
would entail.
Actually a theme threading itself throughout the debate over
the TLAM/N is the uncertainty over whether this particular weapons
system should properly be regarded as a strategic nuclear asset (and
in particular part of the United States's strategic nuclear reserve)
or is instead essentially a tactical/theater nuclear weapon.. As we
have noted, theoretically it could be used in both capacities, yet the
operational demands of each of these roles are substantially in
conflict. If the weapon is to be seen in terms of the nuclear
reserve, its platforms logically should be kept away from the
general naval and land battle for their own safety. In this event,
however, its utility for affecting the outcome of the battle is
obviously much reduced. In the event that the TLAM/N platforms are
committed to the battle, their future contribution as a strategic
nuclear reserve is at peril. One argument that is often advanced in
this connection is th . actually the Navy's SLBM assess could
perform virtually all the theater roles that are envisaged for the
Tomahawk, which would suggest that the TLAM/N adds relatively
little new in the qualitative sense to the American force mix.
Types of platforms are also involved here: clearly TLAM/N's on
submarines would be relatively more impervious to enemy
destruction and thus better suited to the reserve role; somewhat
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more assured communications with surface platforms make them
perhaps best suited to a theater operational role. It also has to be
considered that to the extent submarines are given primary TLAM/N
missions, this dilutes their ASW capabilities, since launching points
for the Tomahawk may not be ideal for ASW operations, and every
TLAM/N placed on board a submarine displaces another weapon. 1 In
particular, an emphasis on TLAM/N loading would affect the capacity
of Navy submarines and surface platforms to carry the TLAM-C as
well as the TASM, and, as one analyst put it, to assign these
platforms with TLAM/N's to NATO's theater nuclear-strike plans
would "place operating constraints on Atlantic theater naval
commanders." 2 It is of interest in this connection that so far the
nuclear Tomahawks have specifically noi been assigned a role in the
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation's strategic war
plan, since this would necessarily conflict with the Tomahawk
platforms' general purpose missions.
In considering potential missions for the TLAM/N, it is
important to note that much of the original justification for the
system had little to do with the weapon's potential utility in
influencing the outcome of the land battle in Central Europe. Indeed
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was initially reluctan* even t
dwell on this particular role for fear that it would encourage the
Europeans to back away from the politically controversial decision
1 Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War At Sea," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 10
(Winter, 1985/86), 13.
2 Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., "U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments
in 1987," PROCEEDINGS (May, 1988), 195.
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to place land-based Pershing ll's and GLCM's in Europe in favor of a
less contentious sea-based cruise-missile deployment for NATO.
Instead he stressed the system's utility for a strategy of horizontal
escalation: deterring a threat to one region by threatening a
response in another. This approach gradually gave way to what
might be considered more traditional rationales, including extending
the American nuclear umbrella to Japan and other non-European
areas and in general increasing the ability of the Navy to project its
power in wide-spread theaters of actual or potential conflict. 1 It
must also be noted that some uniformed officers were attracted to
the TLAM/N because it would give the Navy a much-increased
capability to attack Soviet naval aviation, in particular Backfire
bombers assigned to maritime tasks, without being dependent on the
Air Force for such missions.
2
The Soviet Position
A major factor in the United States' decision to proceed with
R&D on the nuclear Tomahawk, and eventually to its deployment, was
concern about the Soviet Union's progress in developing just such a
nuclear SLCM capability. 3 Indeed, the Soviets have deployed
1 For an analysis that suggests there could be severe political and
crisis stability problems in the deployment of Tomahawk platforms
to Third World areas, see Eric Grove, "Nuclear Weapons in Surface
Navies-More Trouble Than They Are Worth?" DEFENSE ANALYSIS,
Vol. 1, No. 2 (1985), 136.
2Leon Sigal, NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1984), 135-136.
^Jeffrey Duncan, "The Tomahawk Cruise Missile: Arguments For and
Against," OCEANUS (Summer, 1985), 49.
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nuclear-armed cruise missiles at sea since 1962. These earlier
systems, however, were relatively primitive in terms of accuracy
and firing mechanisms, and it is more recent Soviet SLCM
developments that have received the bulk of attention in the debate
over the U.S. Navy's own capabilities in this area. The essential
argument is that the latest generation of Soviet SLCM's feature such
an improvement in range, speed and accuracy that they constitute a
significant threat to tactical and strategic targets both in this
country and in the European theater. Development of American SLCM
assets thus serves as a critical deterrent to Moscow's contemplated
use of such systems.
The Soviets currently have one nuclear-armed, long-range
SLCM in deployment, the SS-N-21 and one in the developmental
stage, the SS-NX-24 (with an IOC at some point in the next few
years). The SS-N-21 (wryly dubbed the "Tomahawkski" by Western
intelligence) is powered by an air-breathing turbojet engine and is
variously estimated to have a range anywhere from 1700 to 3000
kilometers. It can be launched from a standard submarine torpedo
tube. The submarine platform chosen to test the SS-N-21 was the
Victor-Ill class SSN. The system uses an intertial guidance system
as well as TERCOM and once it reaches homing range is probably
guided by a radar or anti-radiation terminal guidance system. It has
a speed of about Mach 0.7, which puts it roughly the same category
as the Tomahawk. The SS-N-21 is expected to be deployed on
several different launch platforms, including the newer SSN's such
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as the "Akula" and "Sierra" classes as well as existing types such as
the "Victor III" class. 1
The SS-NX-24 is an advanced version of the SS-N-21 and has a
much faster speed than the earlier system, perhaps on the order of
Mach 2.0. It is also significantly larger than the SS-N-21 (41 feet
compared to 21 feet), and carries a larger nuclear warhead. It has
undergone launch trials from a former Yankee-class SSBN
specifcially converted for this purpose. Also in reported
development is a ground-launched version of the SS-NX-24, which
would be used in a coastal defense role.2 A lingering question about
both of these Soviet SLCM assets has to do with the relative
sophistication of their technology compared to that of the
Americans. There is some evidence that the Soviets continue to
play "catch-up" here, particularly in terms of the miniaturization of
the propulsion and guidance systems, and this factor may continue to
obtain for the foreseeable future.
3
Even if the Soviet Union continues to lag behind the United
States in the overall capability and sophistication of its nuclear
SLCM program, the question is often raised as to whether it is to the
net advantage of this country to have a competition in this area at
all. The argument sometimes advanced is that taking all factors
1 Clarence Robinson, "Soviets Test New Cruise Missiles," AVIATION
WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY (January 2, 1984), 2.
2Norman Polmar, GUIDE TO THE SOVIET NAVY (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1986), 432; JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY (December 3,
1988), 1409; JANES SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (January, 1989),
18-21.
3Terry Terriff, "Controlling Nuclear SLCM," SURVIVAL
(January/February, 1989), 62.
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into consideration a situation in which both superpowers have
substantial nuclear SLCM assets can only be deleterious to both
American and NATO security interests more generally. One factor
often mentioned is that of geography: the Soviet Union as a massive
continental land power would be relatively more impervious to SLCM
strategic strikes than the United States, where much of the
industrial and communications infrastructure, not to mention
concentrations of population, would be at risk from Soviet boats
stationed off our shores. 1 As Admiral John L. Butts, Director of
Navy Intelligence testified in 1985, "The SS-NX-21 probably is
intended primarily for theatre applications but also very likely
would be employed for strikes against US targets such as command,
control and communication facilities and naval bases. "2 The SS-NX-
24, when it becomes operational, would have even more of a capacity
to strike major industrial centers and key military facilities as
well as C3.3 Moreover, Soviet fleets would not have to travel far to
be on station for strikes against targets in Western Europe, thus
easing command-and-control problems, whereas the U.S. Navy would
have to challenge various Soviet naval strongpoints in order to get
at Soviet targets.4
1 On this threat, see U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, HEARINGS ON MILITARY POSTURES AND HR 10919,
Ninety-fifth Congress, Second session, 1978, Part I, 336.
2 Cited in Terriff, "Controlling Nuclear SLCM." 61.
3Theodore A. Postal, "Banning Nuclear SLCM's," INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY (Winter, 1988/89), 194.
4Segal, NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, 137.
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Related to the above point is the matter of crisis stability as
well as the "lure" that U.S. Navy's surface Tomahawk platforms may
provide to the Soviets for preemption. Navy spokesmen argue that
TLAM/N's mounted on such platforms give nuclear carrier
battlegroups added protection against a possible Soviet nuclear
attack since even if the carrier is sunk other platforms will be able
to deliver a nuclear retaliatory blow against the enemy in response.
At the very least there is no question but that the dispersal of the
Navy's nuclear assets greatly complicates Soviet targeting decisons.
As CNO Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost has argued, the Tomahawk "really
puts the Soviets into a defensive frame of mind, no matter what
direction their doctrine goes. That's deterrence working, and it's
something we must be careful to protect." 1
The counter-argument, however, is that it is the very
existence of such a panoply of nuclear strike platforms in American
battlegroups that is likely to invite a Soviet preemptive nuclear
strike, since that might well be the only assured way to eliminate a
substantial maritime nuclear threat to the Soviet homeland.
Moreover, the vast majority of current Soviet nuclear SLCM assets
are assigned to anti-ship missions. Given American conventional
superiority at sea, the assertion is made that a complete ban on all
nuclear SLCM's is in the American interest since it would greatly
vitiate the Soviet threat to these conventional forces. 2 There is also
1 Jon Stewart, "The Missile That Could Stop START," SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE (January 4, 1989), Briefing p. 3.
^On the disincentives for the American navy to encourage nuclear
combat at sea, the testimony of former Navy Secretary John Lehman
is instructive. See U.S., House of Representatives. Committee on
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the matter of escalation control: if an American commander were
authorized to respond to even a limited Soviet strike against his
battlegroup by launching a nuclear Tomahawk, the Soviets might
regard this as a strategic attack against their assets and respond in
equivalent fashion with strikes against targets in the United States.
The essence of the debate here, in sum, revolves around the
fundamental question of whether it is to the Navy's net advantage to
have both superpowers developing an increasedly sophisticated
nuclear SLCM capability. In particular, given the United States's
general superiority in conventional maritime assets noted above, is
it actually in the American interest to encourage the nuclearization
of the combat environment at sea? A relevant point in this context,
of course, is the perennial "action-reaction" issue: even were the
United States to curtail its own nuclear SLCM program, would the
Soviets necessarily follow suit? The evidence on this point is
rather murky at present, especially because on balance the Soviets
place greater importance on SLCM's to augment their fleets'
capabilities than does the United States.
The Arms Control Challenge
We have already discussed how after the signing and
ratification of the INF Treaty, attention in the arms control
community and in the public generally became focused on the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the possibility of a
Appropriations, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR
1983, hearings, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second session, 1982,
Part II, 160.
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follow-on START agreement that would deal with strategic systems.
In this regard, the potential obstacle that nuclear SLCM's pose to a
strategic arms control regime have become a major issue.
The Soviet Union has made the issue of restrictions on nuclear
land-attack SLCM's a major part of its negotiating agenda for START
(while at the same time showing much less interest in limiting
anti-ship SLCM's). It is interesting to note here that in terms of
how they see their own military needs, Moscow seems to regard
nuclear land-attack cruise-missiles as having an uncertain military
utility, although they may have a certain political relevance. 1 The
Soviets' basic proposal is to limit systems such as the Tomahawk to
a range no greater than 600 kilometers and with an overall limit on
deployment of 400 warheads. These and other suggestions for arms
control at sea have led CNO Admiral Trost to comment that "Mr.
Gorbachev wants to restrict the mobility, flexibility, and capability
of western military power where those prove to be particularly
troublesome to him. That means imposing, or getting us to accept,
limitations on U.S. maritime power. "2 In another statement, he
commented that the Soviets wanted to "pull the fangs" of the U.S.
Navy by banning or severely limiting its cruise-missile capabilities
and md restricting its operations on the high seas around the Soviet
Union.
3
1 James B. Rubin, "U.S. and Soviet SLCM Programs," ARMS CONTROL
TODAY (April, 1986).
2Admiral C.A.H. Trost, "The Soviet Arms Control Offensive," VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY (May 1 , 1988), 423.
3 Charles W. Corddry, ""Soviet Union's arms proposals aim at U.S.
naval strength, official says," BALTIMORE SUN (June 18, 1988), 4.
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What seems clear enough is that Moscow does view the United
States's nuclear SLCM capability with considerable alarm,
particularly given the capacity of the United States to ring the
Soviet landmass with Tomahawk platforms in Northern European
waters, the Arctic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and the
Pacific (which would seem to negate any Soviet opportunity for
destroying NATO's theater nuclear assets early on in a conventional
campaign). A particular American concern is that any regime to
limit nuclear SLCM's might impact as well on conventional SLCM
assets, which are seen as especially important today in sustaining
the theater concept of follow-on forces attack (FOFA). This
envisions the use of conventional weapons to interdict rear echelon
enemy forces before they can be brought to bear at the critical point
of battle in Europe. Conventional SLCM's could make a substantial
contribution to FOFA through long-range strikes from secure
platforms at sea. 1
The TLAM/N itself presents two distinct problems for the
arms controllers. In the first place, there is the matter of
distinguishing a TLAM/N from a TLAM/C or a TASM. The three
weapons have a common airframe and similar external appearance.
Unc'er the circumstances, verification procedures would almost
inevitably seem to require some form of on-site inspection, not a
prospect that necessarily appeals to naval personnel on either side.
A second difficulty is in determining the exact number of
Tomahawks loaded onto a given platform. The problem here is
1 Henry C. Mustin, "The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile," INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY (Winter, 1988/89), 189.
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especially pronounced in the case of VLS-equipped surface
platforms. Surface-ship VLS's can theoretically contain any
number of Tomahawks. In this case even with on-site inspection
the ease with which the Tomahawk can be transported and loaded
would seem to require an almost constant Soviet shipboard presence
as part of a verification regime. 1 The best that US and Soviet
START negotiators could agree on in December, 1988 was that there
should be the establishment of "ceilings" on SLCM's (above and
beyond the 6000 warhead limit for strategic weapons) and that ways
had to be found to achieve "mutually acceptable and effective
methods of verification".
There is considerable irony in the questions that are being
raised about the obstacles nuclear SLCM's pose to a START
agreement, since these systems were earlier regarded by many arms
control advocates as actually constituting a positive contribution to
U.S. -Soviet mutual deterrence and the stability of the nuclear
balance. Given their slow flying speeds, as earlier noted, they were
hardly a first-strike weapon. On the other hand, given their
extreme accuracy and dispersal over a number of platforms, they
were ideally designed as a second-strike weapon. Finally, the
relative immunity t f the Tomahawk to preemption, especially on
submarine platforms, theoretically could lead to lesser reliance on
ICBM and strategic bomber assets, which are vulnerable to
preemption. In this regard, the development of the nuclear
1 Bowen and O'Rouke, "The Tomahawk Cruise Missile", 101.
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Tomahawk could well be seen as providing an underpinning for
substantial reductions in these other systems. 1
In the current environment, however, the challenge rather than
the contribution of nuclear SLCM's to a verifiable arms control
agreement, and more broadly to stability in the Soviet-American
nuclear balance, seems to be receiving the bulk of attention, at least
within the arms control community.2 In particular there is concern
that the so-called "nuclearization" of the maritime combat
environment poses increasing dangers, especially in terms of
escalation containment.^There are a variety of possible approaches
to solving the putative tension between the growing arsenal of
nuclear SLCM's on both sides and the achievement of a START
agreement.
On the matter of distinguishing SLCM's armed with nuclear as
opposed to conventional warheads, Soviet First Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev is reported to have told President Reagan at the
Washington summit in December, 1987 that the USSR had some sort
of helicopter-borne instrument for gathering intelligence (NUCINT)
on SLCM's. The device, he said, could not only detect the presence of
nuclear weapons aboard ships from a distance of 900 to 1200 feet
but also could discern the number of warheads and even their yield.
1 Thomas Schelling, "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 64 (1985/86), 229.
2 For the argument that a complete ban on all nuclear SLCM's would
be in the American interest, see Ivo H. Daalder and Tim Zimmerman,
"Banning Nuclear Weapons at Sea: A Neglected Strategy," ARMS
CONTROL TODAY (November, 1988).
3Richard Fieldhouse, "Nuclear Weapons At Sea," BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (September, 1987).
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The following month American negotiators in Geneva asked to see
this device, and during a visit by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to
Washington in March, 1988 he proposed that the United States and
the Soviet Union undertake a joint test of the equipment in the
Mediterranean. 1
Washington declined this invitation on the grounds that the
exercise would not tell the United States any more than she already
knew about the relevant technology. A senior Administration
official commented that the detection system seemed to be merely
a "helicopter-borne Geiger counter", and expressed serious doubts as
to its workability, especially if an opponent strove to disguise his
weapons by using removable shielding (concrete or steel) to mask
the amount of detectable radiation. If the Soviet NUCINT system
could be shown to have some reliability, it would necessarily have
to be complemented by random on-site inspections (OSI), which
again would involve an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness on the
ships of both superpowers. Interestingly, Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman indicated in Congressional testimony in 1986 that the
United States actually was prepared to accept such OSI: "The Navy
has made it clear that we are prepared to accept on-site inspection
of all our ships, negotiated on a re:iprocal basis, a part of any arms
control agreement." 2 Two years later Soviet Chief of the General
1 Jeremy Leggett and Patricia M. Lewis, "Verifying a START
Agreement: the Impact of INF Precedents," SURVIVAL
(September/October, 1988), 417.
2 U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second session,1986.
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Staff Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev told a visiting U.S. delegation that
the Soviets would also allow OSI of Soviet vessals as part of a SLCM
verification regime.
Despite these forthcoming statements, however, the obstacles
to a full-fledged OSI system for SLCM's remain great, especially in
terms of the reciprocity issue. There are certain technical
possibilities that could help to obviate the OSI question, even if not
totally to eliminate it. For example, through the use of "tags", or
electronic signalling devices locked on to each missile canister, it
may be possible to engage in at least some stand-off identification
of missile inventories. "Passive" tags are roughly equivalent to the
metallic strip seals used by clerks to check out products at a
supermarket and require close-up inspection. "Active" tags, on the
other hand, can be read some distance away. With a tamper-proof
transmitter they "broadcast" digitized and coded radio signals which
can be read by a dedicated receiver. Still other idea in the
conceptual stage is the tagging of each missile with a receiver of
NAVSTAR satellite signals. NAVSTAR is a U.S. satellite navigation
system still in development, which transmits signals for the Global
Positioning System. The main disadvantage here is that missiles on
submarines when submerged would no be able to receive the
signals, and to insist that they emerge at periodic intervals to
receive satellite signals would negate one of their major advantages
as a weapons system. 1
1 Leggett and Lewis, "Verifying a START Agreement," 421-423; Steve
Fetter, "The Use of Tags in Monitoring Limits on Mobile Missiles,"
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The reality, then, is that the only measure that would truly
negate the necessity of an OSI regime would be a total ban on
SLCM's, both conventional and nuclear. Assuming that factories
capable of producing these systems were subject to inspection, any
production of a SLCM would constitute a de facto violation of such
an agreement. A more modest step would be to ban all nuclear-
armed SLCM's, which would be harder to verify than the first
arrangement but considerably easier to monitor than the more
discussed notion of simply putting limits on the number of SLCM's,
both conventional and nuclear. One way to achieve the latter would
be to limit the number of platforms carrying nuclear SLCM's, and to
develop functionally related observable differences (FROD's) in the
form of uniquely configured facilities for storing and launching
these missiles that would allow verification of each platform's
capabilities. This would be similar to the regime imposed on ALCM
carriers in the SALT II agreement. As noted previously, however,
there is no immediate prospect that the latter arrangement is
negotiable within the foreseeable future, and a complete ban on
SLCM's is so remote a possibility that it can be virtually dismissed
as an idea. The challenge that SLCM's, and in particular nuclear
SLCM's, pose to arms control neg<" :ations there'Dre seems likely to
remain as a central point of controversy in discussion of these
systems. 1
LLNL Report UCID-21034, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(March, 1987).
1 For a useful survey of the verification problems in an arms control
regime affecting SLCM's, see Kosta Tsipis, "Arms Control
Verification at Sea: Cruise Missiles," NAVAL FORCES IX (1988).
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Some Political Considerations
In concluding this discussion of the role that the nuclear
Tomahawk can or will play in the post-INF Treaty security
environment, some attention to broader political and what might be
called symbolic questions is appropriate. A critical point here is
the fact that when NATO planners were considering various
alternatives for responding to the Soviet Union's SS-20 buildup-
considerations which eventually led to the the December, 1979
"dual-track" decision-the SLCM was specifically rejected as a main
component of the NATO INF upgrade. There were technical reasons
for this in terms of the more immediate availability of the land-
based Tomahawk and Pershing-ll for deployment. Cost was also a
factor, especially the problem of building sufficient submarine
platforms for the nuclear Tomahawk compared to deploying the other
systems onto facilities already available in Western Europe.
A major political-symbolic element in the December, 1979
decision, however, was the fact that the GLCM's and the Pershing-
M's would be more visible and tangible as a testament to the
American commitment to NATO defense than the sea-based systems.
As we have already discussed, much of the impetus for the INF
upgrade indeed had to do with just such political symbolism, at
least much as more narrowly-defined questions of military doctrine
and mission. The question thus presents itself as to whether the
SLCM can now serve this essentially subjective role as a reassurer
to those Europeans concerned about the steadfastness of American
resolve to defend Europe. Since SLCM platforms are relatively
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"invisible" (in the case of submarines) and widely dispersed outside
continental Europe, it may well be asked whether they provide the
same sort of psychological reinforcement that the ground-based
systems did. Influencing a judgement on this question of course is
the matter of whether America's European allies currently feel an
equivalent need for such a reinforcement as they supposedly did in
1979.
One point that might be introduced here to support an argument
that actually the nuclear Tomahawks are especially well-placed to
perform political-symbolic functions in the post-INF environment
has to do with the somewhat unexpected difficulties that the GLCM's
and Pershing-M's seemed to face in performing their assigned
missions. In testimony before Congress, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Perle admitted that these systems
"turneo out to be far more vulnerable to attack . . . both conventional
and nuclear . . . than those who made the decison to deploy them
anticipated." The major problem here was in a sense technical but
in reality basically political: the difficulty of dispersing these
weapons in a timely fashion.
Timely dispersal is problematic because of the
operational constraints placed on the peacetime
movement of luclear missiles. A timely decison to
disperse in a crisis is almost certain to be rejected by
NATO as an aggravation of an already dangerous
situation. This unhappy state of affairs . . . has profound
implications for the ability of NATO to deter--
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implications that the alliance has so far failed to
comprehend, let alone take action to deal with. 1
Presumably the SLCM assets of the alliance could be deployed
and positioned in a crisis without encountering some of the more
acute political difficulties that confronted land-based INF systems.
This advantage of course has to be balanced against the possible
political complications that would impact on nuclear Tomahawk
deployment in non-NATO areas. In areas such as the Persian Gulf,
for example, the existence of such assets could well exacerbate an
already tense situation. There is also the matter of port visits: as
more and more U.S. Navy platforms become capable of carrying the
nuclear Tomahawk, this is bound to arouse the sensitivities of local
anti-nuclear groups in countries such as Japan (this factor also
obtains in NATO countries such as Denmark and Norway). In sum,
the appeal of nuclear SLCM's from a broadly political perspective
seems distinctly a mixed bag. Thus judgement might also be applied
not unfairly to their strictly military applications. That the
nuclear Tomahawk will play an important role in post-INF security
calculations for the NATO alliance seems beyond dispute. The
exact parameters and potential of that role, however, remain very
much in dispute. As one U.S. Navy supporter of the Tomahawk puts
it candidly, "the true perspective of power that Tomahawk has given
us has yet to be explored fully."2
1 U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, THE INF TREATY, Part
3, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, 1988, 433.




NATO'S NUCLEAR ASSETS ON LAND
In responding to the new security situation created by the
withdrawal of the Pershing-ll and Tomahawk GLCM from Western
Europe as a consequence of the INF treaty, NATO planners faced a
host of options for maintaining deterrence and stability in the
European theater. Among these have been the stationing of more
nuclear SLCM assets off the coast of Western Europe, increasing the
number of nuclear-capable aircraft in the region, and developing and
deploying more tactical battlefield weapons, or short-range nuclear
forces (SNF). 1 We have already discussed the first option, but an
important point to be made here is that while SNF upgrades and a
greater reliance on nuclear SLCM's for NATO deterrence are not
necessarily (or at all) mutually contradictory, there are those who
express considerable doubt about the wisdom of relying on the
nuclear Tomahawk as part of NATO doctrine, and instead stress SNF
modernization as a preferred substitute for such a sea-based
strategy (especially in terms of maintaining the policy of flexible
response). 2 From this perspective, the controversy over NATO's SNF
assets assumes a particularly prominent role.
1 John D. Morrocco, "Allies Weigh New Deployments To Offset
Proposed INF Cuts," AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY (MAY
18, 1987), 18.
2 See, for example, Terry Terriff, "Controlling nuclear SLCM,"
SURVIVAL (January/February, 1989), 57.
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The NATO debate over modernization of land-based nuclear
weapons systems in Europe has in any case assumed an increasingly
high profile. Particularly from the viewpoint of the United States,
Great Britain and France, there is an urgent necessity to make good
whatever gaps in the NATO security posture may have been created
as a by-product of the INF accord. SACEUR General John Galvin
touched on the prevailing concerns when he testified to the Congress
that "I hope . . . that there will not be some kind of euphoria about
INF and everyone will say, 'Well,, the danger is all over now, we do
not need to do these things.' I am a little bit worried about that." 1 A
major way in which to do this theoretically is to proceed with
various measures to improve the capabilities of the theater nuclear
assets that will remain for the NATO alliance once the terms of the
INF treaty are fully implemented, assets that are necessary to at
least blunt the WTO's superiority in conventional arms in the
European region. 2 We will focus here on various such measures that
have been at the forefront of the discussion.
SNF Modernization Options
The one that has certainly received the bulk of the attention
concerns the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL) issue. The Lance as
currently configured is a surface-to-surface missile first deployed
1 United States, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, THE INF
TREATY, Part II (February 3, 1988), One Hundredth Congress, Second
session, 226.
^For a useful review of overall issues in NATO's deployment of SNF
assets, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Managing NATO's tactical
nuclear operations," SURVIVAL (January/February, 1988).
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in 1972 for battlefield use against forward-positioned Warsaw Pact
assets. In addition to the ground-based launching mode in which
NATO now has it deployed, the Lance may also be launched from a
helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft. It may be equipped with either a
conventional or a nuclear warhead, and has a range of approximately
70-80 miles. The yield of the nuclear warhead is estimated in open
source literature at about 100 kilotons. 1
The ostensible advantages that might be expected from the
fact that the Lance can be equipped with either a conventional or
nuclear warhead are somewhat lessened by evidence that its
accuracy is rather suspect and even more by its being deployed on so
few launchers. Since there are only some 990 missiles deployed on
88 launchers in West Germany and Italy, the logic is to arm as many
Lances with nuclear warheads as possible. In actuality, the West
German government never even bothered to buy conventional
warheads for the Lances under their control. Currently, there are in
fact about 700 nuclear-armed and 300 conventionally-armed Lances
in West Germany and a few more in Italy. 2 Another NATO member,
France, also has 32 launchers for its short-range Pluton system. By
way of comparison, the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies
have about 1500 FROG, Scud and SS-21 triple-capable (nuclear,
1 Jim Hoagland, "NATO's Next Missile?" THE WASHINGTON POST
(December 29, 1988), 23.
2 Charles Daniels, "NATO Looks for Arms Control Loopholes,"
BULLETIN OPF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 43 (September, 1987), 9.
See also the statement by Lawrence Woodruff, Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces, to the House Armed
Services Committee in March, 1987 on the FOTL debate.
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chemical and conventional) launchers with ranges from 35 to 185
miles. In nuclear-capable artillery, 2700 NATO pieces are matched
against 6260 Warsaw Pact pieces. Within range of these systems
are as much as 80 percent of NATO air defence batteries, airfields
and nuclear storage sites. 1
It is suggested that the Lance as currently constituted will
have lost much of its utility by the middle 1990's, not only because
of its increasing age and obsolescence but also because the WTO will
have moved their logistics and communications centers just out of
the range of the missile into Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as
hardening these facilities in concrete bunkers. 2 From this
perspective there is considerable reason to consider replacing the
Lance with an entirely new system, but for political reasons there is
pressure to conduct the debate not in terms of introducing
something quite new but rather in terms of a simple "upgrade" of the
Lance itself. Indeed, under the Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP), which Congress appropriated funds for in 1986, there has
been a replacement of the warheads and guidance systems of the
Lance as they reach the end of their operational lives. NATO allies
of the United States have participated in this program, and many
missiles have been so upgraded.
"•Bernard Trainor, NATO"s Tactical Missiles: Updating Set Back," NEW
YORK TIMES (December 15, 1988), 45; North Atlantic Assembly,
DRAFT GENERAL REPORT ON ALLIANCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
1987-1988 (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, November, 1988), 7.
2 Statement by U.S. Army Lt.Col. John Reitz in "Time Blunts
Effectiveness of NATO's Lance Weapon," THE WASHINGTON TIMES
(February 15, 1989), 4.
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The original decison to modify or replace the Lance grew out of
a report by Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) General Bernard
Rogers to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Luxembourg in
1985. General Rogers was tasked to prepare a report outlining
feasible reductions to be made in NATO's theater nuclear arsenal in
response to the allies' agreement to go along with INF
modernization. This was the unpublicized compromise that had been
arrived at as part of the 1983 NATO Montebello agreement, and was
essentially political in nature. The idea was to defuse objections
by segments of West European public opinion to the introduction of
the Pershing-ll's and GLCM's by promising reductions in other
tactical nuclear systems.
The Rogers Plan, among other things, recommended the
withdrawal of an additional 1400 SNF warheads by 1988, and this
has been carried out. The reductions were obtained by removing all
Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM's) from West Germany and Italy;
phasing out the remaining Honest John missiles in Greece and
Turkey; and reducing the number of nuclear artillery shells from
around 6000 to approximately 4000. At the same time, as noted,
the Rogers Plan also called for the modernization of certain SNF
. ystems, such as the production and deployment of new, extended-
range 155-mm and 203-mm nuclear artillery shells, replacing or
extending the range of the Lance, developing a new tactical air-to-
surface stand-off missile (TASM), and continued deployment of new
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and more capable aircraft capable of carrying either the TASM or
new nuclear gravity bombs. 1
More recently, the Air Force has said it wants to use the 250-
kilometer-range Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) IV to fulfill the
role originally envisoned for the TASM, partially because of its
increased effectiveness and partly because of cost-efficient
considerations. 2 IOP for the SRAM-IV is estimated to be about
1993, and it is expected to be the standard nuclear weapon for
tactical aircraft such as the F-IIIG (the SRAM-II will serve an
equivalent function for the B-1B and B-2 strategic bomber force).
Deployment of some 51 F-111G's to Great Britain from the American
Strategic Air Command is expected to begin in late 1989 or early
1990.3
The basic thrust of General Roger's recommendations was
subsequently reaffirmed at regular NPG meetings in 1986 and 1987,
but the West German government has so far prevailed upon NATO to
avoid any language which publically commits them to the language
contained in the Roger's Plan. This was evident, for example, from
the wording of the communique issued from the NPG meeting in the
1 Jesse James, "Theater Nuclear Modernization-the NATO Decision
That Wo.i't Go Away," ARMS CONTROL TODAY (December, 1988). See
also U.S., Department of Defense, SUPPORT OF NATO STRATEGY IN
THE 1990'S. A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance
with Public Law 100-180 (Washington: GPO, January 25, 1988).
2
"NATO Nuclear Jitters", BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
(January-February, 1989), 67.
3 David Fouquet and Nick Cook, "NATO Forced to Rethink Nuclear
Battlefield," JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY (February 4, 1989), 16. " US F-
111s set for UK to fill INF gap," JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY (July 2,
1988), 1335.
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Netherlands in October, 1988. The statement on nuclear
modernization says that the member states had revalidated their
commitment to the original Montebello decision and reaffirmed their
"continual support of national efforts" to fulfill its requirements.
Apparently at German insistence, however, no fixed timetable was
established for implementing the Montebello provisions on
modernization. 1
Given the fact that a decison to develop in effect a Lance
replacement has at least formally been made, the question becomes
what systems are prime candidates for deployment. American
defense planners indicate that they want to have a suitable system
available for the time when it will be needed regardless of whether
at the present time they can secure West German agreement to
deployment. The Army's preference seems to be for a dual-capable
system (able to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads) which
would have an extended range and greater accuracy than the Lance,
and which would be deployed on the new Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS), a quickly-reloadable missile rocket launcher which
is already operational and beginning to be based in West Germany.
The missile Army spokesmen originally wanted to build for the
MLRS was a version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
Tentative plans were for the positioning of several hundred
launchers and nearly 1000 missiles, the majority of them
1"NATO nuclear jitters," BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
(January/February, 1989), 67.
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conventional.'' Congress has been allocating funds for this system
since 1983, and there is a conventional version of it already
deployed in Europe. For several years after 1984, however, the
Congress prohibited the Army from building a nuclear warhead for
the ATACMS until it seemed certain the Europeans would accept its
stationing on their soil. This restriction was removed in the
conference report on the defense budget for FY 1989.2
Despite this decision, DOD has evidently moved beyond
consideration of the ATACMS as a prime candidate for SNF
modernization in Europe, and suggests now that the missile being
considered does not even have a formal title as yet. The idea of
developing a nuclear version of the ATACMS was apparently dropped
because it did not have adequate range (only about 250. kilometers).
The as yet unnamed Follow-On-To-Lance is supposed to have a range
four times that of the earlier system and with much greater
accuracy, even though in terms of its physical dimensions it will
bear considerable resemblance to the ATACMS.
3
ARMS CONTROL AND POLITICS
As with the TLAM/N, there are significant issues of interest to
the arms control coi lmunity and to political analysts c lerally
1
"Army to Begin Flight Testing Tactical Missile System," AVIATION
WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY (April 18, 1988), 20.
^'Compensating for INF", BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
(April, 1988), 59; Elizabeth Pond, "NATO Members Declare Unanimity
on Keeping Nuclear Arms Up to Snuff," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(April 29, 1988), 42.
^Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Working On New Missile for West
Germany," THE NEW YORK TIMES (February 17, 1989), 1.
83
concerning the whole matter of SNF modernization. On the first
point, the most obvious answer to the problems of verification of a
possible treaty regime on SNF systems would be simply to add a
"third zero" to the double-zero arrangement of the INF accords (i.e.,
banning all SNF in Europe). Although there are significant public
pressures in Western Europe to do precisely that, Washington has so
far evinced little interest in such an arrangement, at least until
there are agreements to limit conventional arms, ban chemical
weapons and reduce long-range nuclear forces. The American
position is that SNF modernization is a critical component of the
NATO security posture following the INF treaty, and there is
considerable skepticism about developing any arms control regime
that would merely limit but not eliminate SRF in Europe.
As usual, problems of verification are at the forefront of any
notion of a limited arms control regime involving SNF. The United
States for its part plans to deploy new SNF missiles on the same
tracked MLRS vehicles used for conventionally-armed ATACM's. It
would be extremely difficult in these circumstances to tell the
nuclear weapon from the conventional ATACM's. The MLRS has a
launching box on top of the tracked vehicle which can hold up to
twelve missiles. It might Is possible that the launching box for
nuclear systems could be increased in size so that it could be
distinguished from MLRS's carrying conventional weapons, and this
might even be technically desirable given the greatly-increased
range of the new nuclear missile. Under these circumstances some
variety of "national technical means" might be employed in a limited
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SNF arms control regime. At present, however, this remains
distinctly problematical.
On the matter of the politics of SNF modernization, the
principal pattern that emerges is of a steadily increasing opposition
within West European publics to the traditional role that nuclear
weapons have played in NATO strategy. For example, in 1984 the
percentage of Europeans expressing support for first use by NATO of
nuclear weapons in response to a conventional WTO attack ranged
from a mere seven percent in Denmark to only eighteen percent in
Great Britain. 1 The European publics seemed unconcerned for the
most part about the prospects of a Soviet invasion but more to the
point were confident that "the conventional deterrent is adequate
and that NATO can successfully defend against a conventional attack
without resorting to nuclear weapons. "2
The central focus of the political controversy over SNF
modernization clearly lies in West Germany. Public sentiments in
that country regarding nuclear weapons are a reflection of European
attitudes generally but even more pronounced in their anti-nuclear
slant. Thus polls indicate that seventy-nine percent of West
Germans want all nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe, and sixty
percent are against SNF modernizatio i. Ove' 'ifty percent disagree
1 Wallace J. Thies, "On NATO Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear
Allergy," PARAMETERS (September, 1988), 23.
2Stephen Szabo, "European Opinion After The Missiles," ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY QUARTERLY 24 (Spring, 1986), 11, 13-14. See also
Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public
Opinion in Western Europe," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 98
(Summer, 1983).
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with the argument that nuclear weapons help to deter the WTO and
keep the peace. Given these views, it interesting that only about
three in ten are in favor of spending more on conventional forces
once the terms of the INF accord are realized. 1
Until the signing of the INF treaty the West German
government itself was generally consistent in its support of the
Montebello agreements. Since the INF accord has come into effect,
however, Bonn's position on SNF has been at best mercurial and
unpredictable. Prior to Gorbachev's startling announcement at the
United Nations in December, 1988 that the Soviet Union would be
undertaking substantial cuts in its military establishment, involving
in particular a drawdown of some forces in Eastern Europe,
Chancellor Kohl gave public support to SNF modernization as long as
NATO was willing to develop a "Comprehensive Concept"
(Gesamtkonzept ) detailing how the nuclear and conventional sides of
the Alliance's strategy could be combined into a single plan leading
to arms control negotiations with the Soviets. In particular Kohl
wanted the Gesamtkonzept to focus on a restructuring of NATO's
remaining longer-range nuclear forces while scaling back reliance
on shorter-range nuclear weapons and setting out a plan for
negotiated reductions of SNF and conventions! weapons.^The drawing
up of the Gesamtkonzept is expected to be completed in early 1990.
Kohl also linked a resolution of the FOTL issue with a substantial
1 "New Attitudes in West Germany" (an interview with Josef Joffe),
WORLD PRESS REVIEW (December, 1988), 26.
^Clay Clemens, "Beyond INF: West German's centre-right party and
arms control in the 1990's," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 65 (Winter,
1988/89), 69.
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drawdown or even elimination of short-range nuclear artillery on
German soil. 1
On the other hand, even within Kohl's own Christian Democratic
Party (CDU), there were concerns expressed about the implications
of a new NATO emphasis on SNF. Thus CDU Parliamentary leader
Alfred Dregger and his deputy Volker Ruhe referred to the special
threat of lower-range nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal that
would essentially hit only German soil.2 The phrase adopted by Ruhe
was, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." Aside from
what has been called the "singularization"
problem, German conservatives were also concerned with the
possibility of decoupling: the notion advanced was that an emphasis
on modernization of SNF was implicitly an effort by the United
States to confine any possible future conflict in Europe employing
nuclear weapons to the continent itself, sparing Washington the
necessity of committing its own strategic forces to European
defense.
The vast majority of the Social Democratic opposition, not to
mention the totally anti-nuclear Greens, in a curious community of
views with these CDU representatives, also rejected SNF upgrading,
although far more for the first • ason than the secc id. 3 At its party
Congress in Munster in September, 1988, the SPD passed resolutions
1 Robert McCartney, "Bonn Indicates Shift on Atomic Arms,"
WASHINGTON POST (November 16, 1988), A12.
^Pond, "NATO Members Declare Unanimity on Keeping Nuclear Arms
Up to Snuff," 43.
^Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Odd German Consensus Against New
Missiles" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May, 1988), 16.
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rejecting any modernization of Lance as well as any measures
designed to "compensate" for systems removed under the INF Treaty.
Over the long term, the SPD favors removing all nuclear forces from
German soil and reducing NATO's nuclear deterrent strictly to sea-
based systems linked to American central strategic assets. This is
to be accompanied by a shift to a non-offensive conventional defence
on German soil itself. CDU spokesman Alfred Dregger has also
supported the idea of moving NATO nuclear deterrence out to sea,
especially since the nuclear SLCM's would be capable of reaching
deep into WTO territory rather than simply being used to convert
Germany into a nuclear battlefield. In a blunt statement in
Washington in June, 1987, he demanded "to know whether and with
which air- and sea-based systems the United States is prepared to
maintain intermediate-range deterrence." 1
However, following the Gorbachev pronouncement of unilateral
Soviet conventional reductions and an announcement in January,
1989 by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that Moscow would also be
reducing her tactical nuclear inventory in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Kohl's position began to waver. It
seems likely that Shevardnadze's pronuncement was directly
calculated to influence the debate over SNF in Bonn especially since
it was delivered personally first to West German Foreign Minister
Genscher. "It is a very clever ploy by the Soviets," said one NATO
official. "They get rid of old tactical nukes that they don't need
1 Ronald Asmus, "West Germany faces nuclear modernization,"
SURVIVAL (January-February, 1989), 505. 508.
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anyway, and this puts heavy political pressure on Bonn." 1 The
German Chancellor returned to a position enunciated immediately
after the INF agreement to the effect that removal of IRINF and
LRINF systems shifted the focus of any possible European military
confrontation back onto German soil. Under the circumstances, he
advanced the idea of postponing SNF modernization until a way might
be found to avoid that possibility, either through an East-West
agreement on reducing conventional arms or through negotiated
reductions in both sides' arsenals of SNF. Neither Kohl nor his
Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, are as such in favor of a
"third zero", since they fear it would lead to the total
denuclearization of European defense. 2 In this respect, they are in
agreement with the British, French and American positions, all of
which are strongly opposed to the total elimination of SNF.
3
Secretary of State James Baker during a visit to Bonn in early
February, 1989 reiterated the American position that Washington
hoped for a final decision on the FOTL question as of the NATO
summit meeting the following May. Chancellor Kohl held firm to his
hesitations, however, saying that he saw no need for such a decison
until—at the earliest-after German Federal elections in 1990. His
response was u -oubtedly conditioned by the fact that an estimated
1 William Tuohy, "Soviet Missile Cuts Could Upset NATO
Modernization," LOS ANGELES TIMES (January 21, 1989), 4.
2
"Chancellor Kohl Meets With President Reagan," DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN 88 (May, 1988), 45. In his meeting with President
Reagan in February, 1988, the German leader called for reductions
and equal ceilings on SNF but "no zero resolution, no denuclearized
zone-and least of all, in Europe."
3Kohl V Genscher," THE ECONOMIST (February 11, 1989), 44.
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80% of West German opinion was opposed to bringing new missiles
into West Germany until the possibility of further arms agreements
with the Soviet Union had been more fully explored. 1 It is perhaps
significant that on this same visit Baker was informed by his
counterparts in Denmark and Norway that they essentially shared
Kohl's position and saw no need for an early resolution to the
question and in particular to the placing of undue pressure on the
West Germans for a decision congenial to Washington.2
In April, 1989, Washington finally accepted the West German
desire to have any formal decision on the FOTL postponed until after
1990. This served to defuse the tension over this issue at least
temporarily, but only a few days after the American statement there
was renewed controversy when the German Chancellor reiterated his
demand that NATO should immediately enter into arms control
negotiations with the Warsaw Pact to reduce SNF in Europe. Both
the United States and Great Britain flatly rejected this suggestion,
and the forthcoming NATO summit meeting at the end of May
threatened to become an arena of contention between these two
seemingly irreconcilable positions.
3
Prior to Washington's concession on the timing of FOTL,
SACEUR General John Galvin had submitted to NATO Secreta rv-
General Manfred Woerner the results of a nuclear weapons study
1 John Goshko, "Baker Tour Exposes U.S.-West Germany Friction,"
WASHINGTON POST (February 17, 1989), 34.
2 Don Oberdorfer and Robert J. McCartney, "Baker, Kohl Fail To Agree
on Missiles," WASHINGTON POST (February 14, 1989), 6.
3Robert J. McCartney, "U.S. Accepts Delay by NATO On Updating
Short-Range Arms," WASHINGTON POST (April 21, 1989).
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conducted during the previous year that held out the possibility of a
reduction in NATO's nuclear assets in Europe by about a thousand,
mainly nuclear artillery shells but also aircraft ordnance as well.
If adopted, this would reduce the Alliance's overall arsenal of
warheads to approximatelu 2900, compared to a high of about 7000
in the 1960's and 1970's. Nuclear artillery, with a range of about 18
miles, has always been an extremely sensitive weapons systems for
the West Germans-implying the potential of a devastating "limited"
nuclear war on German soil-and the idea of reducing the number of
such weapons was presumably advanced in large measure to mitigate
West German opposition to SNF modernization. To date, however,
this proposal seems to have had little effect on Chancellor Kohl's
position. 1
In a very real sense, the intense debate over the FOTL in
particular is not so much a disagreement about specific military
capabilities as it is a symbol of West Germany's continuing
committment to NATO. Should Bonn ultimately decide to reject any
FOTL, this is calculated to have severe repercussions for NATO
solidarity, especially in Paris, London and Washington. French
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas stated for example in December,
1f 8 that any delay in NATO SNF modernization will inevitably lead
to a gap in the Alliance's nuclear capability by 1992 and a distinctly
unfavorable shift in the balance of forces in Europe. The concerns
about the FOTL issue in these capitals is exacerbated by the
1 THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (January 24, 1989); Charles Corddry,
"NATO Weighs New Nuclear Weapons Cuts," BALTIMORE SUN (February
17, 1989), 1.
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widespread evidence suggesting basic shifts in West German public
opinion on the threat of WTO aggression and the role of nuclear
weapons in NATO strategy that we have already reviewed.
It is important to recognize that it has been a long-term
position of the WTO to call for the elimination of ail ground-based
short-range nuclear missiles in Europe (and to denounce strongly
NATO plans for SNF modernization). Given the substantial
advantages that the Soviet Union and her allies enjoy in various
conventional arms categories, such a proposal has never evoked
much enthusiasm from the majority of NATO defense planners. 1 The
fear, however, is that continual delay in arriving at a final decison
on FOTL and other SNF upgrades will have the effect of leading to the
outcome the WTO proposes, at least on the NATO side of the divide in
Europe. Two authoritative military analysts gloomily suggest that
"given current sentiments about nuclear weapons among allied
publics, the most that NATO probably can hope to do with regard to
nuclear forces in Europe is to avoid a further slide toward
denuclearization. Yet, even that objective may be difficult to
obtain." 2
1 For a good survey of the interconnection between the conventional
and nuclear balance in Europe and its impact on NATO doctrine, see
Stephen J. Cimbala, "NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: A
Reluctant Embrace," PARAMETERS (June, 1988).
^Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe,"




In attempting to arrive at any summary judgments about
NATO's security options in the aftermath of the INF treaty, one is
inevitably constrained by the fact that the treaty's provisions have
only relatively recently entered into effect, and thus it is quite
difficult at the present time to assess how NATO strategy and
doctrine can or should evolve in response to the elimination of
Alliance INF assets in Europe. Nevertheless a few tentative
conclusions may be offered based on the analysis contained in the
earlier pages of this essay.
Critics of the INF treaty suggested that it was the first step
on the road to the "de-nuclearization" of NATO's deterrent capability.
This seems to be largely a misplaced fear. As one writer puts it,
"removal of superpower intermediate njclear forces will have little
effect on the overall stability of deterrence in Europe. To
contemplate a successful European campaign, by their standards, the
Soviets would have to somehow prevent NATO from nuclear
escalation and from turning the war into an extended contest of
attrition." 1 Despite the forebodings of some, even after the terms
of the INF treaty are fully implemented, NATO will in all probability
continue to have short-range nuclear forces (SNF) on the continent
(barring the extremely unlikely elimination of all such assets as
part of a "third zero" agreement with the WTO). Moreover, the
steady deployment of TLAM/N platforms in the European maritime
1 Stephen J. Cimbala, "NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: A
Reluctant Embrace," PARAMETERS (June, 1988), 61.
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theater, even if they are not formally assigned to NATO, will give
the Alliance an expanding nuclear capability that indeed threatens
escalation should the Soviets decide on a military move into
Western Europe. In addition, some 400 Poseidon SLBM warheads
have been allocated by the United States for NATO's defense.
Finally, there are the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain as
well as American central strategic assets. This panoply of nuclear
might seems sufficient to make any rational decision for aggression
by the WTO highly doubtful. 1
Of course future arms control agreements could theoretically
change this situation in a manner deleterious to NATO's deterrent
posture, but again the fears expressed on this point by some seem,
at least at present, to be overdrawn. Not only is a total ban on SNF
in Europe, as noted above, highly unlikely, but it is equally
implausible that the United States would agree to a complete
elimination of its nuclear SLCM assets, at least in the absence of a
major drawdown of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities of a
sort hard to imagine. Conventional SLCM's are very much part of the
picture here as well: even those in the arms control community who
are dubious about the nuclear Tomahawk tend to accept that the
TLAM/C gives the Navy a very important capacity to influence a land
battle in Europe. As we have already discussed, a total ban on
nuclear SLCM would likely impact on the United States arsenal of
1 An excellent survey of the basic ingredients in the geopolitics of
European defense is Hugh Faringdon, CONFRONTATION (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
95
conventional SLCM's, and there is a relatively small constituency
pressing for such an outcome.
Even though it is unlikely that NATO will consent to beat its
nuclear swords into plowshares, there will continue to be a debate
about the best mix of nuclear and conventional forces in terms of
overall NATO strategy. A key aspect of this debate will be varying
attitudes toward what one author has called deterrence stability
versus crisis stability . In brief, the former involves one side's
having sufficient guaranteed rataliatory power to make a conscious
decision for aggression by an enemy unattractive, either because
achievement of his objectives is unlikely or because he is fearful of
disproportionate punishment for his transgressions. Crisis
stability (or instability), on the other hand, refers to situations in
which neither side is firmly committed to aggression, but there is a
danger of unintended escalation to hostilities given each side's
deterrent posture. Critical to crisis stability is the relative degree
of incentive for either to strike first in order to gain decisive
military advantage. The overall point is that what may be ideal for
deterrence stability may also be highly deleterious to crisis
stability. 1 Deployment of the TLAM/N, for example, has been
criti ized precisely on these grounds. Whatever view one takes of
the expansion of American nuclear SLCM capabilities, it is hardly
possible to avoid dealing with the dilemma outlined above.
The Nature of the Threat
1 John Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(Fall, 1986), 7-8.
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The debate over NATO's deterrence capabilities also has to be
influenced by a continuing rigorous assessment of the character and
liklihood of major threats to Western interests and security, not
only in Europe but in the global perspective as well. In this regard
the recent conclusions of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy are of some interest. The Commission was a bipartisan
Pentagon group assigned the task of developing an overall security
strategy for the United States in the coming decades, and included
amongst its members such luminaries as Henry Kissinger, Albert
Wohlstetter, Zbigniew Brzezinski and others. In one of its more
controversial analyses, the Commission suggested that the United
States should moderate its past preoccupation with the danger of an
all-out Soviet attack in Europe, and instead focus more on regional
threats to American security interests in the developing world. In
doing so, moreover, the Commission recommended that the United
States play down its reliance on nuclear weapons and shift toward a
strategy of deterrence that would emphasize more advanced and
accurate non-nuclear weapons.
1
The above conclusions seemed calculated to raise some
concerns among the European members of NATO that the United
States mig it move toward a "de-coupling" of its security position
from that of her European allies. Indeed one specialist close to the
Commission indicated that an early draft of the report recommended
that American troops be thinned out in Europe but this was later
1 The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, DISCRIMINATE
DETERRENCE (Washington: GPO, January, 1988).
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withdrawn. 1 In its final version, the report reaffirmed the wisdom
of a continuing strong American military presence in the European
theater and the foward deployment of American forces as part of
NATO's strategy for deterring WTO aggression. Even though the
Commission eventually supported the conventional wisdom
concerning American ties to NATO, some of its conclusions did touch
on some fundamental questions regarding the allocation of American
resources given a balanced overall threat assessment.
The fact is, of course, that the United States-unlike most
NATO states-is a global power with global interests and
responsibilities, and this has to influence specific decisions on
defense commitments to the security of Europe. To be sure the
maintenance of Western Europe as a free and economically
prosperous partner of the United States has to be considered the
first priority of American foreign policy. On the other hand, there
is no question but that there are a rising number of other challenges
to American security interests in different regions of the world.
Given this fact, what portion of American military resources should
legitimately be assigned to Europe at the possible expense of the
American position in these other regions? We have referred earlier
to the fact that soi.ie U.S. Navy analysts have concerns that a formal
assignment of substantial TLAM/N assets to NATO would reduce the
Navy's flexibility in meeting challenges elsewhere. 2 Overhanging
1 Bernard Trainor, "U.S. Is Urged to Reduce Reliance on Atom Arms,"
NEW YORK TIMES (January 11, 1988), 6.
^To meet this problem, one writer has called for "a simple,
declaratory statement that the SLCM/s will be available in any
emergency", which, in his opinion, "should calm allied concerns and
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this whole issue is also the matter of probabilities. Certainly the
WTO continues to maintain very large military forces in Europe,
which inevitably implies a continued threat of aggression. In the
Gorbachev era, however, how likely is such aggression compared to
emerging threats elsewhere? There are no easy answers here, but
the basic question is going to have be steadily addressed in the
coming years.
Alliance Decision-Making
Another general conclusion which emerges rather forcefully
out of the analysis contained in this paper is that there is a greater
need than ever for a genuine process of consultation and compromise
between the North American and European members of NATO. Gone
are the days when the United States's overwhelming preponderance
in economic and military power generally gave it the decisive voice
in determining NATO strategy. A report from the North Atlantic
Assembly states that the "need to adjust US and European
responsibilities in the Alliance should be confirmed in a new
transatlantic bargain between the United States, Canada and the
European members of the Alliance." 1
It is unclear at present just what the specifics o J 'his "new
transatlantic bargain" might entail, but it is less difficult to
describe the sorts of outcomes and situations that it would be
maintain the decades-old deterrent." James L. George, "The Triad
After INF and START," PROCEEDINGS (May, 1988), 116.
1 North Atlantic Assembly, NATO IN THE 1990'S (Brussels: North
Atlantic Assembly, May, 1988), 11.
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designed to avoid. One would be the type of negotiation that took
place at the Soviet-American summit at Reykjavik in October, 1966.
When the news emerged that President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev had discussed eliminating all ballistic missiles and even
all nuclear weapons, the reaction in Western Europe was an equal
mixture of astonishment and anger, since such a step called into
question the fundamentals of the American nuclear guarantee of
European security as it had existed since 1949. No matter how
compelling and even noble in the abstract total nuclear disarmament
between the superpowers may have been, the spillover effect on
NATO members was dramatic, particularly since they had received
no advance notice that such a discussion would take place. 1
Then there is the current controversy over Chancellor Helmut
Kohl's suggestion that the NATO Alliance enter into immediate arms
control negotiations with the WTO to reduce short-range nuclear
forces (SNF) in Europe. This proposal has been summarily rejected
by Washington (and by Britain as well), yet Bonn has the support of
about half the NATO membership for its position, including Italy,
Belgium, Spain, Greece, Denmark and Norway. There are strong
arguments that have been advanced by the Bush Administration
against the idea of any near-term negotiation on SNF, especially
given the threat which it might pose to the very idea of flexible
response in defending Europe, but it is important that this dispute be
1 For the official American position on the Rejkjavik summit, see
U.S., Department of State, "The Rejkjavik Meeting," GIST (December,
1986) and George Schultz, "Rejkjavik: A Watershed in U.S. -Soviet
Relations," U.S. Department of State, CURRENT POLICY no. 883
(November, 1986).
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resolved on the basis of a mutual adjustment of positions and
genuine attempt at compromise. For the United States simply to
dismiss any idea of SNF arms control for the foreseeable future, in
effect unilaterally vetoing such a concept,will likely leave a
considerable residue of bitterness and tension within the Alliance,
especially given the fact that the WTO has approximately a fifteen-
to-one advantage over NATO in short-range missiles (which would
seem to support the idea that at least a preliminary negotiation
with the WTO to reduce this disparity might be appropriate.) 1
Political Dynamics
Avoiding such an outcome is especially important today in
view of the fundamentally changed political environment in Western
Europe that we have outlined earlier in these pages. There is a
considerable irony evident when one examines that environment
prior to the INF upgrade decision in 1979 and the one obtaining after
the conclusion of the INF Treaty almost ten years later. In the
earlier period the United States accepted the lead of the West
Europeans, notably the West German Chancellor, in agreeing to
deploy Pershing-ll's and GLCM's to Europe in order to bolster
European confidence in the continued Ar.ie .an security commitment
"•in apparent recognition of this fact, leaders of both the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees have suggested a plan whereby
SNF negotiations would be initiated but with the understanding that
they would not effect the deployment of the Follow-on-to-Lance.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe,
expressed some support for this idea. Michael Gordon, "Bush Is
Criticized On Capitol Hill Over NATO Dispute," NEW YORK TIMES (May
4, 1989), 1.
101
to the NATO countries. As noted, the 1979 decision was essentially
driven by political symbolism, that is, the symbolic reaffirmation of
the coupling of European and American security.
Under current circumstances, however, it is the Americans
who are insistent on maintaining and modernizing NATO's nuclear
assets whereas many in Western Europe, notably the West German
Chancellor, are insisting that there is no need for an immediate
decision on the nuclear question and that hopefully arms control
negotiations will obviate the necessity of ever making such a
decision at all. It is important to recognize in this context that the
military utility of the original INF upgrade program was relatively
minor compared to the political effect. The withdrawal of the
Pershing-ll's and GLCM's therefore has to be assessed only partly in
terms of its impact on NATO military capabilities. The real
assessment that has to be done concerns the possibly exaggerated
public expectations about detente and arms control in Europe that
resulted from the completion of the INF treaty.
Could such sentiments lead to what is pejoratively termed the
"Finlandization" of Western Europe? Such a development can fairly
be described as one of the nightmares hanging over NATO defense
planners for a number of years. As a negative formulation.
Finlandization would involve a gradual drift into neutrality by
successive European countries, withdrawal from the NATO alliance,
and a broad accomodation to Soviet foreign policy demands in return
for ostensible freedom in domestic affairs. As part of the process
American military forces would perforce be expelled from the
continent. The model for all this is of course Finland itself and its
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particular relationship with the Soviet Union, based on the 1948
Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance.
Finnish spokesmen themselves are consistently angered by the
critical evaluations offered concerning their policy toward Moscow,
and indeed proclaim (with some apparent justification) that it has
been notably successful in protecting Finnish interests. 1 Whatever
one thinks about the Soviet-Finnish relationship, however, alarums
about its somehow being duplicated in Western Europe generally
seem very wide of the mark for the foreseeable future. For one
thing, "Finlandization" depends on an overwhelming preponderance of
military power by one side over the other, a situation hardly
comparable to that obtaining between the WTO and NATO or likely to
obtain. Moreover, Finland because of geographical and political
factors (having to do particularly with the so-called "Nordic
balance") has had neutrality virtually dictated to it as the only
conceivable policy. A coherent association of sixteen NATO nations
clearly has far more leverage in maintaining a policy independent of
the Soviet Union, especially since the United States has committed
itself to that end for some forty years now.
In sum, Finlandization hardly seems to be a spectre haunting
Western Europe. Actually, h might be argued that its spread may be
far more likely in Eastern Europe than in the West, given recent
events in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere. In this sense
1 For a good assessment of the matter, see Adam Garfinkle,
"FINLANDIZATION": A MAP TO A METAPHOR (Philadelphia: Foreign
Policy Research Institute, 1978).
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Finlandization might be an outcome devoutly to be wished by
Western policy analysts, given what it implies for a lessened Soviet
domination over the East European nations. 1
Future Prospects
The only way in which the European members of NATO
seemingly might be tempted by the Finland model would be if
Washington makes any one of three fundamental although quite
different mistakes: 1) an abrupt withdrawal of its forces and more
generally of its security guarantees from the European continent; 2)
adoption of a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union that in
effect ruled out arms control talks or any other attempt at resolving
East-West differences; 3) a retreat into unilateralism in which
Washington attempted simply to dictate the terms and
implementation of NATO strategy with only minor concessions to
European sensitivities on these matters. Stated in this way, it
hardly seems beyond the capacity of the United States to adopt a
policy stance toward NATO that will in effect eliminate any real
possibility of a drift toward Finlandization in Western Europe.
This upbeat assessment, however, should not disguise the fact
that based on the evidence presented here the NATO security posture
after the INF treaty is going to be at least somewhat more
problematical than it was prior to the conclusion of the treaty. As
two defense analysts put it, "NATO will have to learn to live with a
lower order of both deterrence and defense in Europe in the post-INF
1 For an elaboration of this argument, see Stephen A. Garrett, FROM
POTSDAM TO POLAND (New York: Praeger, 1986), 215-218.
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treaty era than that to which it has become accustomed. The
alliance has painted itself into a corner and the paint will not dry.
Though willing to accept a substantial denuclearization of its
European defenses, it is unwilling or unable to put its non-nuclear
defenses in order." The same individuals go on to say, however, that
this pessimistic conclusion "does not mean that chances of a future
war in Europe are appreciably greater than they are today." Barring
major mistakes by Western decision-makers and force planners,
they conclude, there is no reason to doubt that the Alliance can
continue to deter WTO aggression. 1
This seems to be an eminently sensible position to take.
After all, NATO still disposes of an impressive arsenal of both
conventional and nuclear capabilities. Even if defense analysts
might hope that more steps could be taken in certain discrete areas
to improve and modernize these capabilities, they should not be
thrown into despair if for a variety of reasons not everything on
their agenda can be achieved. The freedom of the NATO countries to
be sure depends importantly on their military assets. Yet it also
depends as well-and perhaps even more fundamentally-on the
continued will to remain free. Despite all the controversy and
uncertainty br etting the Alliance after the INF treaty, there is no
evidence that this will has faded in any material respect.
1 Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe,"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Spring, 1988), 754.
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